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BEYOND BURGER KING: THE FEDERAL
INTEREST IN PERSONAL JURISDICTION
DAVID S. WELKOWITZ *
INTRODUCTION
Now, one would think that in a rational system, especially one that
seeks (or should seek) clarity and definiteness, experienced lawyers
could simply and with conviction unanimously answer [the client's]
question: 'Can I sue the guy who sold me the [defective] tanker here in
Indiana?' But alas we know, to our embarrassment, that the only hon-
est answer the lawyer can probably give is a 'Gee, I can't say for sure."T HAT statement, by Judge Evans in Hall's Specialties, Inc. v.
Schupbach,2 capsulizes the frustration of courts attempting to deter-
mine whether the assertion of jurisdiction over a defendant comports
with constitutional standards. Even after numerous Supreme Court deci-
sions spanning the past several years,' the subject remains imponderable.
Although most case law and commentary on the subject focus on the
exercise of jurisdiction by state courts, the problem is no less complex in
the federal courts.4 Unfortunately, case law provides little thoughtful
* Associate Professor, Whittier College School of Law. J.D. New York University
School of Law, 1978; A.B. Princeton University, 1975. I would like to thank my col-
league David Treiman for his insightful comments on earlier drafts of this Article and for
his willingness to discuss ideas as this Article progressed. I would also like to thank Ellis
Prince and Richard Gruner for their comments on an earlier draft of the Article. Finally,
I thank Gary Wittenberg, Whittier '87, for his research assistance.
1. Hall's Specialties, Inc. v. Schupbach, 758 F.2d 214, 216 (7th Cir. 1985).
2. Id
3. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987); Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 US. 462 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v.
Hall, 466 US. 408 (1984); Calder v. Jones, 465 US. 783 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler Maga-
zine, 465 US. 770 (1984); Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee, 456 US. 694 (1982); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 US. 286
(1980); see also Rush v. Savchuck, 444 US. 320 (1980) (quasi in rem jurisdiction).
4. Recently, interest in jurisdiction problems in federal courts has increased. See.
e-g., Abrams, Power, Convenience, and the Elimination of Personal Jurisdiction in the
Federal Courts, 58 Ind. L.J. 1 (1982) (arguing for a federal concept of personal jurisdic-
tion based on presence of defendant in United States); Berger, Acquiring In Personam
Jurisdiction in Federal Question Cases: Procedural Frustration Under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 4, 1982 Utah L. Rev. 285; Fullerton, Constitutional Limits on vationwide
Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 79 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1 (1984) (arguing that the
Constitution does limit the exercise of personal jurisdiction by federal courts); Green,
Federal Jurisdiction In Personam of Corporations and Due Process, 14 Vand. L. Rev. 967
(1961) (sufficient contacts with some part of United States rather than forum state alone
should result in jurisdiction over corporation); Sann, Personal Jurisdiction in Federal
Question Suits: Toward a Unified and Rational Theory for Personal Jurisdiction over Xon-
Domiciliary and Alien Defendants, 16 Pac. L.J. 1 (1984) (prescribing "consistent, sensi-
ble" scheme of personal jurisdiction in federal question cases); Seidelson, The Jurisdic-
tional Reach of a Federal Court Hearing a Federal Cause of Action: A Path Through the
Maze, 23 Duq. L. Rev. 323 (1985) (arguing that a federal court hearing a federal cause of
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guidance for a federal judge faced with a personal jurisdiction issue. This
Article examines the problem of personal jurisdiction or "amenability" 5
with a focus on federal courts, and develops an analytical framework that
can be used by all courts, state and federal, in resolving personal jurisdic-
tion questions.
Part I analyzes current limitations on personal jurisdiction, concen-
trating on federal question and diversity cases. It discusses the inappro-
priateness of current analysis. Part II discusses the role of Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure Rule 4 in personal jurisdiction and the constitutional
limitations on its exercise. It concludes that courts interpret Rule 4 too
restrictively and often use an incorrect constitutional standard to mea-
sure the assertion of personal jurisdiction in federal courts. Parts III and
IV propose that the constitutional standard used must be one better inte-
grated with other due process analyses. Moreover, this Article proposes
that fifth amendment, rather than fourteenth amendment, standards
should govern all federal actions. Current jurisdictional analysis fails to
do justice to either the federal interests involved or to the rights of the
parties. The proposal advanced in this Article addresses these problems
in state and federal courts, focusing on federal courts, where the lack of a
realistic standard seems most pronounced. Part V discusses how the fed-
eral courts should apply the proposed standard in different categories of
cases. Although in many instances the results achieved by the proposed
test will not differ from those reached using existing analyses, the propo-
sal is intended to make the process more rational and consistent.
I. DUE PROCESS LIMITS
In 1877, the Supreme Court in Pennoyer v. Neff,6 recognized that due
process limits the exercise of personal jurisdiction by the courts. 7 Juris-
action may assert jurisdiction over non-resident defendant in any manner provided by
rules or statute); Stephens, The Federal Court Across the Street: Constitutional Limits on
Federal Court Assertions of Personal Jurisdiction, 18 U. Rich. L. Rev. 697 (1984) (sug-
gesting that the fifth amendment compels consideration in federal court jurisdiction simi-
lar to those considerations the fourteenth amendment imposes upon state courts); Note,
Alien Corporations and Aggregate Contacts: A Genuinely Federal Jurisdictional Standard,
95 Harv. L. Rev. 470 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Alien Corporations] (noting the need for a
theoretical basis for an acceptable federal jurisdictional standard, suggests implementa-
tion of the aggregate contacts test).
5. "Amenability" refers to the authority of a court to force a defendant to come into
the forum and to render a valid judgment against a party, assuming proper notice is
given. It is distinct from service, which serves as the method of giving notice. Techni-
cally, proper jurisdiction requires both amenability and notice, as well as process that
accords with the local statutes. Although the Constitution does not require compliance
with local statutes, failure to do so will be fatal to jurisdiction nonetheless. See Abrams,
supra note 4, at 3-4.
6. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). overruled, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).
7. See id. at 733. In Pennoyer, the Court simply used a "sovereign power" theory of
jurisdiction. According to this analysis, the sovereign has authority over anything within
its borders and nothing outside them. See id. at 722-23; see also, Gottlieb, In Search of
the Link Between Due Process and Jurisdiction, 60 Wash. U.L.Q. 1291, 1291-1300 (1983);
[Vol. 56
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dictional analysis, however, seldom is discussed in relation to other due
process analyses,' but rather is discussed as a unique subset of due pro-
cess.9 On its face, this seems curious. 10
Jurisdictional analysis has evolved since Pennoyer. The "modem" ap-
proach to jurisdiction and due process dates from International Shoe Co.
v. Washington." There, the Court further defined due process to require
that a defendant have "certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.' "12 But as Justice Black, concurring in
the result, pointed out, such a standard is highly subjective and difficult
to apply. 3 As a result, courts have struggled with the task of determin-
ing what "minimum contacts" and "fairness" mean in the jurisdictional
context.
The language of International Shoe indicates that the sufficiency of the
"contacts" is measured against some concept of "fairness."' 4 Clearly,
"fairness" must have some context; contacts that are sufficiently fair in
one setting will not necessarily be fair in another setting.' 5
In its subsequent decision in McGee v. International Life Insurance
Co., 6 the Supreme Court indicated that, in addition to the sufficiency of
the defendant's contacts with the forum, the state's interests in the con-
flict would be relevant to the court's determination of finding the defend-
ant amenable to jurisdiction.' 7 The state's interest in McGee consisted of
providing a convenient forum for its citizens injured by out-of-state busi-
Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75
Nw. U.L. Rev. 1112 (1981).
8. See infra notes 145-158 and accompanying text for a discussion of traditional due
process analyses.
9. See, e.g., 2 R. Rotunda, J. Nowak, J. Young, Treatise on Constitutional Law
Substance and Procedure (3d ed. 1986). This three volume standard text on constitu-
tional law by Professors Nowak, Rotunda, and Young does not discuss personal jurisdic-
tion in its due process sections. The treatise relegates the entire subject to a single, albeit
lengthy, footnote. See id. § 17.8, at 252 n.10. The authors state that a discussion of
personal jurisdiction "is beyond the scope of this treatise." Id.
10. This recalls Professor Ely's remark that "to one accustomed to the savagery of
constitutional criticism, writers on procedure seem strangely, if refreshingly, accepting."
Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 693, 698 (1974).
11. 326 US. 310 (1945).
12. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 US. 457, 463 (1940)).
13. See id. at 325 (Black, J., concurring). Justice Black noted that "there is a strong
emotional appeal in the words 'fair play,' 'justice' and 'reasonableness'... [b]ut they were
not chosen by those who wrote the original Constitution." Id. at 310.
14. Id. at 320.
15. For example, suppose that an insurance company sold a policy to the plaintiff's
employer in Connecticut. The plaintiff, a New York resident, fairly could not sue the
company in California, although the company had sold one insurance policy in California
to a third party. Cf. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 US. 220 (1957). Accord-
ing to McGee, the person to whom the California policy was sold, however, could sue the
insurance company in California. See id. at 223.
16. 355 US. at 220.
17. See id. at 222-23.
1987]
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nesses.1 McGee also implicitly recognized that the overall reasonable-
ness of the situation may allow jurisdiction. 9
International Shoe and McGee seem to require the use of a test that
balances governmental interests against private rights when determining
the question of fairness.2 ° The Court's more recent decisions concerning
personal jurisdiction, however, suggest that a traditional balancing test is
not being used. These decisions, most notably World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson2 and Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 22 have adopted
the formula stated in Hanson v. Denckla,23-that the defendant must
have "purposely availed" itself of the benefits and protections of the fo-
rum's laws before due process will be satisfied.24
By adopting purposeful availment as the sine qua non of amenability,
the Court has turned a balance of factors analysis into a two-step process
that is highly protective of defendants. First, courts must determine
whether the defendant has sufficient "contacts" that have resulted in its
purposeful availment of the benefits and protections of doing business in
the forum that the defendant may " 'reasonably anticipate' out-of-state
litigation."25 Only then does the court examine other interests to deter-
mine the fairness of asserting jurisdiction under the circumstances.
18. See id. at 223.
19. See id. at 224.
20. See Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508, 510 (2d Cir. 1960)
(describing International Shoe as "applying substantially a balancing of interests").
21. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
22. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
23. 357 US. 235 (1958).
24. Id. at 253. See also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 US. 462, 474-76
(1985); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
25. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at 474-75. This test "ensures that a
defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of 'random,' 'fortuitous,'
or 'attenuated' contacts." Id. at 475 (citations omitted).
The Court's recent opinion in Asahi Metal Industrial Co. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct.
1026 (1987), however, adds some confusion to the first step of the analysis. Justice
O'Connor, writing for a plurality, focused on whether the defendant " 'himself' ",
through some purposeful conduct, created a substantial connection with the forum, id. at
1031 (emphasis in original) (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475), which is akin to the
focus of the test articulated in World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 US. at 297-98 (unilateral
activity of consumer in bringing defendant's product into the forum was not purposeful
availment by the defendant of the benefits and protections of the forum), and Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. at 253 (unilateral activity of plaintiff does not satisfy the requirement
of purposeful availment by the defendant). Although Justice Brennan, writing for the
majority in Burger King and dissenting in Asahi Metal, reiterated the "purposeful avail-
ment" standard, see Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475; Asahi Metal, 107 S. Ct. at 1035 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting), in Asahi Metal he focused more on defendant's purposeful contacts
with the forum, not necessarily requiring purposeful conduct by the defendant himself to
create such contacts. See Asahi Metal, 107 S. Ct. at 1035 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (as
long as defendant is aware that his product is being marketed in the forum, he will bene-
fit-no " '[a]dditional conduct'" or direct business activity in the forum is required
(quoting majority opinion, 107 S. Ct. at 1035)).
Step one of the analysis ultimately requires minimum contacts, however, regardless of
whether the standard for minimum contacts is purposeful contacts, or purposeful con-
duct by the defendant creating such contacts.
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Under this test, no matter how strong the other interests in litigating in a
particular forum may be, if the defendant has not purposely availed itself
of the forum state's laws, it normally cannot be subjected to the jurisdic-
tion of that forum's courts.2 6
The Court's opinion in Burger King; lustrates the emphasis placed on
contacts and deemphasis placed on other interests. The defendants in
Burger King, residents of Michigan, 7 entered into an agreement with
Burger King, a Florida corporation, to open and operate a Michigan-
based franchise.2 8 The defendants fell behind in their franchise pay-
ments. 29 Burger King sued in federal district court in Florida for breach
of contract and trademark infringement under the Trademark Act of
1946, popularly known as the Lanham Act.30 The defendants unsuccess-
fully challenged the Florida court's exercise of personal jurisdiction,3
and Burger King ultimately prevailed on the merits of both claims.32
On appeal, defendants challenged only the exercise of jurisdiction
over, and the judgment on the merits of, the state contract claim; they
did not appeal jurisdiction or substance regarding the federal trademark
claim.33 The Eleventh Circuit reversed, upholding defendants' claim of
lack of personal jurisdiction. An appeal to the Supreme Court followed,
and the Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit.34
Justice Brennan's opinion for the Supreme Court recapitulates prior
doctrine in the area of jurisdiction, specifically the "minimum contacts"
26. See Lilly, Jurisdiction Over Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 Va. L. Rev. 85,
106-07 (1983) (discussing World-Wide Volkswagen). Professor Clermont has written that
the Court's analysis breaks down into "power" and "reasonableness" components. Cler-
mont, Restating Territorial Jurisdiction and Venue for State and Federal Courts, 66 Cor-
nell L. Rev. 411, 413 (1981). Only if power exists does one go on to measure
reasonableness. Id. at 423-25. Pennoyer v. Neff almost exclusively used a "power" ra-
tionale for jurisdiction, with little regard for the "reasonableness" factor. 95 US. 714
(1877). Thus, even in an enlightened era of due process analysis, the trappings of Pen-
noyer appear not to be discarded; Pennoyer simply has been embellished with extra pre-
cautions of fairness.
The Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz decision may have affected this analysis, however.
471 US. 461 (1985). In Burger King. Justice Brennan wrote that "[reasonableness] con-
siderations sometimes serve to establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser
showing of minimum contacts than would otherwise be required." Id. at 477 (emphasis
added).
27. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 US. 462, 466 (1985).
28. Id. at 464-67.
29. Id. at 468.
30. 15 U S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
31. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 US. 462, 469 (1985); Burger King
Corp. v. MacShara, 724 F.2d 1505, 1508 (11th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 471 US. 462 (1985).
32. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 US. at 469; Burger King Corp. v. Mac-
Shara, 724 F.2d at 1508.
33. See Burger King Corp v. MacShara, 724 F.2d at 1508; see also Burger King Corp,
471 US. at 469-70 n.ll. The Eleventh Circuit mentioned in passing that the suit in-
cluded a trademark claim, but did not comment further on the subject. See 724 F.2d at
1508.
34. 471 US. at 487.
19871
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analysis initiated by International Shoe" and further developed in
Shaffer v. Heitner3 6 and World- Wide Volkswagen.37 Ultimately, in Bur-
ger King the Court determined that the defendants did have "minimum
contacts" with Florida and that the exercise of jurisdiction over them did
not violate due process.38
Despite its apparently orthodox approach, the opinion seems to extend
prior doctrine by pointing to a choice of law provision in the franchise
agreement as an element of "minimum contacts."39 Previously, the
Court had held choice of law analysis irrelevant.4" The decision also dis-
cusses the reasonableness and fairness to defendants of the chosen fo-
rum.4 Prior to Burger King, the Court barely had acknowledged this
notion.42
The most intriguing aspects of the case, however, are those that the
35. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The author assumes that the reader is familiar with the
major cases and will discuss them only as necessary to support the arguments presented
in this Article. For an extended discussion of the case law, see Fullerton, supra note 4;
Lilly, supra note 26. For a discussion of more recent cases, see Weinberg, The Helicopter
Case and the Jurisprudence of Jurisdiction, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 913 (1985).
36. 433 US. 186 (1977).
37. 444 US. 286 (1980).
38. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 487 (1984).
39. See id. at 479.
40. See id. at 481-82. The Court in Burger King distinguished "choice-of-law analy-
sis-which focuses on all elements of a transaction, and not simply on the defendant's
conduct-," id. at 481, from a choice of law provision. Prior to Burger King, the Court
shunted aside suggestions that a state's interest in applying its own law to a conflict
should be considered in the minimum contacts analysis. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186, 215-16 (1977) (although Delaware has an interest in outcome, choice of law
does not demonstrate that forum is fair); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 US. 235, 254 (1958)
(although Florida has substantial interest in the suit, choice of law factors are not deter-
minative of personal jurisdiction over action).
Furthermore, the Burger King Court's notion that the "contemplated future conse-
quences" of a contract can serve as significant contacts, 471 U S. at 479, represents a new
concept that may have interesting ramifications for personal jurisdiction. Choice of law
clauses may undergo new scrutiny if they are to become virtual forum-selection clauses.
A business may be willing to have a particular state's law apply but be unwilling to
litigate there.
41. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at 476-78 (after minimum contacts are
established, "fair play and substantial justice" are considered).
42. In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 US. 286 (1980), the Court
reaffirmed that due process analysis involved "minimum contacts" and the reasonable-
ness of subjecting the defendant to the authority of the particular forum. Id. at 291-94.
Justice Brennan's dissent criticized the majority for deemphasizing "fairness" in favor of
"contacts." See id. at 300 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Clermont, supra note 26, at
430-58; supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text. By contrast, the Burger King Court
discussed the reasonableness and fairness to the defendants. See 471 US. at 478-82. Of
course, in Burger King, unlike in World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court had already deter-
mined that sufficient contacts existed. See id. at 478-80. The Burger King Court also
indicated that, in rare cases, reasonableness of jurisdiction could be established with a
lesser showing of contacts than is usually required. See id. at 477 (citing Keeton v. Hus-
tler Magazine, 465 US. 770, 780 (1984); Calder v. Jones, 465 US. 783, 788-89 (1984);
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1957)). Much the same
attitude existed in the Court's opinion in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 US. 770
(1984), a diversity case rendered during the previous term. See id. at 780-81.
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Court did not discuss. First, the Court found Florida's long-arm statute
determinative of the jurisdiction of the federal court without discussing
any federal statute or rule to support this finding.43 Much of the opinion
seems to treat the case as if it were brought in a state court. The Court
mentioned, for example, that defendants entered "special appearances"
without commenting on the fact that no such procedure exists in federal
court.'
Second, and more troubling, is the treatment of the federal claim. Be-
cause the defendants had chosen not to contest personal jurisdiction or
appeal the judgment against them on the trademark claim, the Court
barely mentioned that Burger King's complaint also included a trade-
mark claim45 that invoked federal question jurisdiction. Interestingly,
the Court indicated in a footnote that Florida law also applied to deter-
mine jurisdiction under the federal question claim." The Court did not
discuss why it would use state long-arm statutes and fourteenth amend-
ment standards aimed at state governmental conduct to analyze jurisdic-
tion for a federal question claim. Finally, the defendants' failure to
contest jurisdiction for the trademark claim raises the issue of whether a
defendant can consent to jurisdiction regarding a federal claim and con-
test jurisdiction regarding a related state law diversity claim in the same
case.
Similar problems have arisen in other contexts.47 The Court's failure
to delve into the federal aspects of the Burger King case illustrates the
failure of federal courts to address important federal interests when faced
with a personal jurisdiction question, including the rights of the litigants
to have the federal claim litigated in an appropriate forum and any inter-
est expressed in the federal statute that gives rise to the claim for having
that claim litigated in a particular forum. Thus, there is a significant gap
in this area of the law.
43. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 US. 462, 468-69 (1985). For example,
the Court does not cite Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 4(e) which directs federal
courts to look to state statutes. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e); see also infra notes 48-55 and
accompanying text.
44. In fairness to the Court, the record shows that defendants did file papers denomi-
nated "Special Appearance" in the district court. See Record on Appeal in the Circuit
Court at 107; see also Burger King Corp. v. MacShara, 724 F.2d 1505, 1508 (11 th Cir.
1984) (defendants entered special appearance to contest personal jurisdiction), rev'd sub
nom. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 US. 462 (1985). The proper procedure re-
quired filing a pre-answer motion or pleading to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule 12(b)(2). Defendants eventually filed a motion for summary judgment
and dismissal, Record at A43, which was denied. Record at A21.
45. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 US. 462, 468-69 (1985).
46. Id. at 470-71 n.12.
47. For a discussion of the problem of whether jurisdiction for one purpose gives
jurisdiction for another purpose, see infra notes 243-47 and accompanying text. The
problem of the appropriate constitutional standard for jurisdiction in federal question
cases is discussed infra Part II.A.
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II. RULE 4 AND FEDERAL JURISDICTION
The appropriate due process standard emanates from the statutory and
constitutional authority under which a federal court asserts personal ju-
risdiction.48 There is no general federal jurisdiction statute comparable
to general state long-arm statutes. Amenability and service of process
issues in federal court generally fall under the auspices of Rule 4 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.49
Most of Rule 4 concerns proper methods of serving process on defend-
ants to provide notice of the action (manner of exercising jurisdiction),
rather than when the defendant may be subject to jurisdiction (amenabil-
ity to the exercise of jurisdiction).50 The methods of effecting service are
48. "Arguably, federal courts do not require enabling legislation to assume adjudica-
tory jurisdiction under federal standards, even in diversity litigation." von Mehren &
Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1121, 1123
n.6 (1966) (noting Second Circuit so held in Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282
F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960), but subsequently reversed itself in Arrowsmith v. United Press
Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963)).
49. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4.
50. See id. Amenability problems in federal court arise primarily in diversity cases
because the general federal venue statute limits claims not based solely on diversity to the
districts where all defendants reside or where the claim arose, except where another fed-
eral statute provides otherwise. 28 U S.C. § 1391(a) (1982). See Foster, Long Arm Juris-
diction in Federal Courts, 1969 Wis. L. Rev. 9, 28-29 (1969).
Statutes with their own venue provisions most often allow venue where the defendant
lives, such as the antitrust venue provision, 15 US.C. § 22 (1982), or where the claim
arose, or both. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U S.C. § 77v (1982); Futures Trading
Act, 7 US.C. § 13a-2(4) (1982); Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1719 (1982); Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2) (1982);
Civil Rights Act, 42 US.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (1982). The Federal Interpleader Act, which
provides for both nationwide service of process and venue where any claimant lives, con-
stitutes a notable exception. See 28 US.C. § 2361 (1982) (process); 28 U.S.C. § 1397
(1982) (venue). For a further discussion of statutes with nationwide service of process,
see infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
If the claim arose in the forum district or an act constituting a violation occurred there,
in most cases the defendant will have sufficient contacts with that district for specific
jurisdiction to exist under the International Shoe standard. See, e.g., Violet v. Picillo, 613
F. Supp. 1563, 1573-79 (D.R.I. 1985). One would also expect that an individual defend-
ant would be subject to jurisdiction where he or she resides. For venue purposes, corpo-
rations may be sued wherever they do business. See 28 US.C. § 1391(c) (1982).
Although one would also expect them to be subject to jurisdiction in most such districts,
it is certainly possible, in theory, that "doing business" for venue purposes would not be
sufficient for jurisdictional purposes. The cases, however, generally find either the stan-
dards to be the same or that the venue standard is a higher one. See cases cited infra note
67. This probably occurs because so many state statutes are construed to go to the limits
of due process; if jurisdiction is constitutionally unfair, then a court would be unlikely to
find that venue exists there, or even to reach the question. And even where the state
statute falls short of due process limits, it is unlikely that a court would determine the
venue question before deciding the jurisdictional issue.
In most federal question cases, a defendant probably would forego a jurisdictional ob-
jection, believing it to be pointless. Nevertheless, amenability problems have arisen in a
number of federal question cases. See, e.g., Bandai America, Inc. v. Bally Midway Mfg.,
775 F.2d 70, 75 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1265 (1986) (in copyright and
antitrust action, court held that defendant's relation to forum state is important to per-
sonal jurisdiction); Catrone v. Ogden Suffolk Downs, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 850, 855-56 (D.
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found primarily in Rule 4(c)(2)(C) S' and 4(d). 2 Rule 4(f) limits the ter-
ritorial reach of process to "the state in which the district court is
held."53 It does provide for service outside the state, but only "when
authorized by a statute of the United States or by these rules."' Rule
4(e) permits service upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the
state "under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed" by a fed-
eral statute or a statute of the state in which the district court sits.55
Some federal statutes contain their own nationwide service of process
sections.56 If the federal statute providing the right of action does not
provide for nationwide service, the parties of the federal action are lim-
ited in their ability to serve process by the "circumstances" set forth in
the state statute or some other standard of amenability.57 This raises the
Mass. 1986) (discussing amenability problems under both the Sherman Antitrust Act and
the federal Civil Rights Act); Hughes v. Lister Diesels, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 233 (F.D. La.
1986) (discussing amenability under the Outer Contintental Shelf Lands Act). Moreover,
variations on the Burger King situation involving a defendant who clearly is subject to
jurisdiction regarding one claim but challenges it as to another are not infrequent. See
infra notes 234-53 and accompanying text.
51. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C).
Rule 4(c)(2)(C) provides that a summons and complaint may be served pursuant to the
law of the state in which the district court sits, or by mail. See id.
52. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d).
Rule 4(d) describes to whom, where, and by what manner service can be effected upon
different classes of defendants. See id
53. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
54. Id
55. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e). Arguably, the Rule speaks only to methods of service and
not to standards of amenability to jurisdiction. However, the language of the rule indi-
cates otherwise. Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i) allows a federal district court to use the methods of
service of the state in which it sits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(i). Yet Rule 4(e) also
incorporates state statutes for service of non-resident defendants. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
Logically, Rule 4(e) is intended to invoke the state's amenability standards, particularly
in view of its language that service may be made "under the circumstances and in the
manner" that the state statute provides. See 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure, § 1075, at 494-96 (1987); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e). In addition, there
is no reason to assume that Rule 4(c)(2)(C), or its predecessor Rule 4(d)(7), or Rule 4(d)
were intended to give additional power to the courts to make up their own federal statu-
tory amenability standards. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C), 4(d); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(7),
repealed by Pub. L. No. 97-462 § 2(3)(B), 96 Stat. 2528 (1983). Indeed, Rules 4(c) and
4(d) do not say anything about amenability. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c), 4(d). Strictly speaking,
this may not limit the amenability reach of a district court. In a practical sense, however,
arguing about whether that limitation goes to "amenability" or "service" is pointless if
one is not empowered to serve process. In either case, the person over whom jurisdiction
is sought properly cannot be made a party to the action. Wright and Miller note that,
although Rule 4(d)(3) arguably permits a separate amenability standard, most courts
have declined to read that into the rule. See 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra, § 1075, at
487-88.
56. See, eg., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 US.C. § 78aa (1982); Federal Inter-
pleader Act, 28 U S.C. § 2361 (1982); Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29
U.S.C. § 1132(e) (1982). Rule 4(e) does not conflict with these statutes because it allows
service on out-of-state inhabitants "under the circumstanes ... prescribed" by a federal
statute. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
57. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e). If the federal statute sets forth only the circumstances
under which service can be made, the plaintiff may use any method of service provided in
1987]
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following problems in federal court cases: (1) If the case were brought in
state court, state long-arm statutes would limit the "circumstances" of
permissible service. Does Rule 4(e) require a federal court to adopt four-
teenth amendment limitations placed by federal law on state action, or
should a federal court use a standard developed under the fifth amend-
ment?58 (2) In a case involving a federal statute that explicitly provides
for service, are the constitutional standards different from those used in
other due process cases? 9 (3) If a fifth amendment standard applies to
determine the constitutionality of extraterritorial service, is the standard
used different from the standard under the fourteenth amendment?"
Unfortunately, the evolution of Rule 4(e) provides only slight illumi-
nation. Prior to its amendment in 1963, Rule 4 only allowed process
from a district court to run to the state line.6 Once long-arm statutes
became common in the states, limited federal court process, particularly
in diversity cases, became anomalous.6 2 Effective July 1, 1963, Congress
amended Rule 4 to allow the use of state long-arm statutes to reach out-
of-state defendants.63 The amendment was designed to allow federal
courts to exercise personal jurisdiction in diversity cases in a manner sim-
ilar to the courts of the state in which they sit.' The courts and Con-
gress gave little thought to the Rule's effect on federal question cases
because, at that time, venue in such cases was proper only in the district
where all defendants resided.65 When, in 1966, venue was expanded to
include the district where the claim arose,6 6 potential long-arm problems
Rule 4. See International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 593 F.2d 166, 175-76 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979); Thompson v. Battle, 54 F.R.D. 222, 225 (N.D. I11.
1971).
58. See infra notes 68-120 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 145-58 and accompanying text.
60. See infra note 171.
61. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f), 31 F.R.D. 593, 626 (1963 amendments).
62. See generally 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1061,
at 217 (1987) (1963 Rule 4 amendments were "a recognition of the important changes
that had taken place since 1938 in state practices regarding jurisdiction and service of
process."); Vestal, Expanding the Jurisdictional Reach of the Federal Courts: The 1963
Changes in Federal Rule 4, 38 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1053, 1054-56 (1963) (federal court juris-
diction reaches as far as the comparable state court).
63. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f). See generally Kaplan, Amendments of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 1961-1963 (I), 77 Harv. L. Rev. 601, 619-22 (1964) (discussing problems
that arose prior to the amendment and concluding that amendment of Rule 4 had put
methods of securing personal jurisdiction over non-residents furnished by state law on a
"clearer footing" by amending Rule 4).
64. Kaplan, supra note 63 at 620-21; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4, 374 U.S. 869 (1963) (state-
ment by Justice Black and Justice Douglas dissenting from promulgation of 1963 amend-
ments to Rule 4 for fear that diversity actions would increase).
65. The advisory committee notes on the 1963 amendment to Rule 4(e) state only
that "[t]he necessity of satisfying subject-matter jurisdictional requirements and require-
ments of venue will limit the practical utilization of these methods of effecting service."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e) advisory committee notes; accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 4, 374 US. 869
(1963) (Black & Douglas, JJ., dissenting from promulgation of 1963 amendments to Rule
4).
66. Pub. L. No. 89-714, §§ 1, 2, 80 Stat. 1111 (codified as 28 U S.C. § 1391 (1982)).
1987] PERSONAL JURISDICTION
for federal question cases resulted.67
A. Rule 4(e) and Federal Question Cases: Fifth
or Fourteenth Amendment?
Several federal statutes contain provisions providing for nationwide
service of process. 68 In applying federal statutes that provide for nation-
wide service of process, courts properly find that the fifth amendment
restrains their jurisdictional authority.69 In determining whether they
have the authority to exercise personal jurisdiction, courts test the suffi-
ciency of defendant's aggregate contacts with the United States."'
If a federal statute does not provide for nationwide service of process,
then in interpreting Rule 4(e), most federal courts, without any clear sup-
port from legislative history, have decided that Rule 4(e)'s authorization
to use state long-arm statutes extends to federal question cases." These
courts have held that in such a case Rule 4 requires that state jurisdic-
67. The concept of residence for venue purposes is broader than the "minimum con-
tacts" necessary for personal jurisdiction. If jurisdiction were expanded to encompass the
venue concept of residence, certain defendants, particularly corporations, would have
problems. In practice, though, that appears not to have occurred. Many courts view the
standard for venue to be greater than for jurisdiction. See, e.g., Conaway Ent. v. Dyna
Indus., 547 F. Supp. 577, 578 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (to be deemed as doing business in a
district for venue purposes, activity must be more than the minimum required to meet a
due process objection to personal jurisdiction); Lubrizol Corp. v. Neville Chem. Co., 463
F. Supp. 33, 36-37 (N.D. Ohio 1978) (requirement that corporation be doing business
requires more than that defendant be amenable to service of process); Philadelphia Hous-
ing Auth. v. American Radiator & Std. Sanitary Corp., 291 F. Supp. 252, 257 (E.D. Pa.
1968) ("[Mlore activity is needed to subject a defendant corporation to venue in a juris-
diction than would be needed to subject it to service of process there"). Other courts,
however, have determined that the standards for venue and jurisdiction are the same.
See, e.g., Galonis v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 498 F. Supp. 789, 791 (D.N.H. 1980); West-
phal v. Stone Mfg. Co., 305 F. Supp. 1187, 1191 (D.R.I. 1969); Champion Spark Plug
Co. v. Karchmar, 180 F. Supp. 727, 731 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
68. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1982); Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U S.C. § 78aa (1982); Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 US.C.
§ 1132(e) (1982). In addition, Bankruptcy Rule 7004(d) provides that, in a bankruptcy
action, "[lthe summons and complaint and all other process except a subpoena may be
served anywhere in the United States." 11 U, S.C. Rule 7004(d) (Supp. Ill 1985).
69. See, e.g., FTC v. Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251, 256-57 (5th Cir. Unit A July
1981) (jurisdiction was proper since a Florida corporation necessarily had sufficient mini-
mum contacts with the United States to satisfy due process requirements); Mariash v.
Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1143 (2d Cir. 1974) (jurisdiction was proper after application of
fifth amendment due process standards to a claim under the federal securities laws).
70. See FTC v. Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d at 256-57; Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589
F.2d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 1979); see also Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d at 1143. But see Sun
First Nat'l Bank of Orlando v. Miller, 77 F.R.D. 430, 433-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (ascertain-
ing authority to exercise jurisdiction based on defendant's contacts wvith the state under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
71. The Supreme Court seems to have endorsed this view in its recent decision in
Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 108 S. Ct. 404 (1987). Also see the cases cited
in 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1075, at 496-98 (1987).
The lack of legislative guidance is illustrated by Wright & Miller's reference to the "ap-
parent intent of the draftsmen of Rule 4(e) to use state provisions for service" in federal
question cases. 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra, § 1075, at 496 (emphasis added). Indeed,
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tional standards apply, even though the substantive right "arises under"
federal law.72 Therefore, the majority of courts have used the "minimum
contacts" standard set out in International Shoe7 3 and its progeny 74 to
determine whether the court had jurisdiction over the defendant.
For example, in Max Daetwyler Corp. v. R. Meyer,7 the plaintiff
brought suit against a foreign defendant in federal court on a patent in-
fringement claim. Because the patent statutes76 do not contain a long-
arm provision, the court obtained jurisdiction using the Pennsylvania
long-arm statute under Rule 4(e).77 In reviewing the constitutionality of
jurisdiction, the Third Circuit rejected a fifth amendment standard based
on the defendant's aggregate contacts with the United States in favor of
the International Shoe fourteenth amendment standard of "minimum
contacts" with the state of Pennsylvania.7" The court held that the Rule
4 provision allowing service of process "under the circumstances" of the
state statute incorporated the state's amenability standards.79 The court
recognized "that use of a state standard may produce anomalous results
when applied to the litigation of a federal claim."80 Nevertheless, it felt
bound by the language of the Rule and the apparent congressional intent
to use fourteenth amendment standards.8'
Similarly, in Violet v. Picillo,2 several defendants were sued for violat-
ing the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Li-
they note that in general "it is unclear whether state or federal law governs amenability"
under Rule 4(e). Id. at 494.
72. Point Landing, Inc. v. Omni Capital Int'l, 795 F.2d 415, 426-27 (5th Cir. 1986)
(en banc) (per curiam), aff'd sub nom. Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 108 S.
Ct. 404 (1987); Max Daetwyler Corp. v. R. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 297 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985); Violet v. Picillo, 613 F. Supp. 1563, 1574 (D.R.I. 1985);
Colon v. Gulf Trading Co., 609 F. Supp. 1469, 1475-77 (D.P.R. 1985).
73. The test as set forth in International Shoe is as follows:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam, if [the defendant] be not present within the territory of the forum, he
have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 US. 310, 316 (1945) (citations omitted).
74. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 US. 462, 471-72, 474, 476 (1985);
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 US. 408, 414 (1984); Calder v. Jones,
465 US. 783, 788 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 US. 770, 780-81 (1984);
Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 US. 694, 702-03
(1982); Rush v. Savchuck, 444 US. 320, 324 (1980); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 US. 286, 291 (1980); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 US. 235, 251 (1958); Mc-
Gee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 US. 220, 222 (1957).
75. 762 F.2d 290 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 US. 980 (1985).
76. 35 U S.C. §§ 272, 281, 283-94 (1982); id. at §§ 271, 282 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
77. See 762 F.2d at 290, 300.
78. Id. at 293-97. The court already had determined that the statutory requirements
had been met because Pennsylvania's statute goes to the limits of due process. Id. at 293.
79. Id. at 295.
80. Id. at 296.
81. Id.
82. 613 F. Supp. 1563 (D.R.I. 1985).
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ability Act (CERCLA),s3 a federal environmental statute. After
determining that CERCLA did not provide for nationwide service of
process, 4 the court decided the jurisdictional questions based on four-
teenth amendment standards. 5  Numerous other decisions are in
accord.
s6
In Point Landing, Inc. v. Omni Capital International,87 the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, resolved a split in its own
circuit over whether the fifth or fourteenth amendment standard of ame-
nability applied to a federal question case."8 It rejected a standard based
on the defendant's "aggregate contacts" with the United States by find-
ing that the language of Rule 4(e) mandated the use of state law. 9
83. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982).
84. 613 F. Supp. at 1569. But see United States v. Bliss, 108 F.R.D. 127, 135 (E.D.
Mo. 1985) (court found that CERCLA implied nationwide service of process). A late
1986 amendment to the statute added a provision allowing nationwide service of process.
Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1647 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(e)
(Supp. 1987)). 42 U.S.C. § 9613(e) provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]n any action by
the United States under this chapter, process may be served in any district where the
defendant is found, resides, transacts business, or has appointed an agent for the service
of process."
85. 613 F. Supp. 1563, 1574-76 (D.R.I. 1985).
86. See, eg., DeMelo v. Toche Marine, Inc., 711 F.2d 1260, 1269-70 (5th Cir. 1983)
(because Longshoreman's Act did not provide for nationwide service of process under
Rule 4(e), fourteenth amendment standards applied to determine personal jurisdiction);
DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 286-90 (3d Cir. 1981) (because
admiralty claim arose under a statute which did not authorize nationwide service of pro-
cess, Rule 4(e) required that fourteenth amendment standards apply), cert. denied, 454
US. 1085 (1981).
87. 795 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (per curiam), aff'd sub nom. Omni Capital
Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 108 S. Ct. 404 (1987).
88. Id. at 424-27. The court held that the nationwide service of process provisions
found in the Commodities Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, 7 U.S.C. §§ 13a-I, -
2, 18(d) (1982), did not apply to the provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act provid-
ing for private actions, 7 U S.C. § 25 (1982), under which plaintiff sued. See 795 F.2d at
423. Thus the court analyzed whether jurisdiction was proper under Rule 4. Id. at 424.
The court noted that the Fifth Circuit had split over what standard of amenability to
apply, id. at 419, and discussed the following cases, id. at 424-27.
In Lapeyrouse v. Texaco, Inc., 693 F.2d 581 (5th Cir. 1982), overruled, Point Landing,
795 F.2d at 427, and Terry v. Raymond Int'l, Inc., 658 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct.
1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1975 (1982), overruled, Point Landing, 795 F.2d at 427,
Fifth Circuit panels held that fifth amendment standards of amenability, rather than limi-
tations of state long-arm statutes, applied to nondiversity cases. See Lapeyrouse, 693 F.2d
at 585; Terry, 658 F.2d at 401-02. Nevertheless, when determining the constitutionality
of asserting jurisdiction in both cases, the courts examined defendant's contacts with the
state in which the district court sat. See Lapeyrouse, 693 F.2d at 586; Terry, 658 F.2d at
403. Yet in Burstein v. State Bar of California, 693 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1982), decided
three days before Lapeyrouse, another Fifth Circuit panel held that Rule 4(e) requires
application of the state's standard of amenability. Id. at 514-15.
89. Point Landing, Inc. v. Omni Capital, 795 F.2d 415, 426-27 (5th Cir. 1986) (en
banc) (per curiam), aff'd sub nom. Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 108 S. Ct.
404 (1987). The court applied the state long-arm statute to limit jurisdiction even though
it recognized the anomaly of doing so when adjudicating a uniform national law. Id. at
426-27. Although the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Fifth Circuit, it did so
on narrow grounds. The Court held that, in the absence of a nationwide service provision
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Reading Rule 4(e) as requiring a fourteenth amendment standard has
not achieved unanimous acceptance.9" Even in Point Landing, Judge
Wisdom, dissenting in part with six judges, asserted that "Rule 4 pro-
vides the mechanics for service of process [and] [i]t has no necessary rela-
tion with a court's acquiring personal jurisdiction."'" He argued that
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 83, which provides for the
promulgation of local rules, the federal courts could fashion a rule to
deal with jurisdictional questions even on a case-by-case basis.92 He went
on to say that to the extent Rule 4(e) provides for the use of state law,
this language is permissive, not mandatory.93 He concluded that the ap-
propriate due process standard is aggregate contacts with the United
States.94
As noted in the Daetwyler decision, some federal courts have rejected
the International Shoe fourteenth amendment standard in favor of a fifth
amendment standard that examines a defendant's aggregate contacts
with the United States to determine if those contacts are sufficient to
satisfy due process.95 Such a fifth amendment standard, however, may be
applied in a variety of ways.
For example, in Holt v. Klosters Rederi A/S,9 6 a Michigan citizen sued
a Norwegian company under the Death on the High Seas Act.97 The
court held that personal jurisdiction was measured by a fifth amendment
standard9" based on the defendant's minimum contacts with the United
in the Commodity Exchange Act, Rule 4(e) required application of the state long-arm
statute before the Court could reach the question of sufficiency of contacts. 108 S. Ct. at
409. Because it was virtually conceded that Louisiana's long-arm statute did not permit
service under the circumstances, the Court rested its decision on that ground, id. at 4034,
declining to reach the constitutional issue concerning whether the appropriate test is ag-
gregate contacts with the United States, id. at 4033 n.5.
90. See, e.g., Bar's Leaks Western, Inc. v. Pollack, 148 F. Supp. 710, 713 (N.D. Cal.
1957) (court implies that in federal question cases, where the compulsion of the Erie
doctrine is absent, it is not bound by state statute and state due process standards when
determining the amenability of a foreign corporation to process); Abrams, supra note 4,
at 6-9; see also Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 48, at 1125 n.6 (when enforcing
federal claims, some aspects of state law should be disregarded).
91. Point Landing, Inc. v. Omni Capital, 795 F.2d. 415, 429 (5th Cir. 1986) (en bane)
(per curiam), aff'd sub nom. Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 108 S. Ct. 404
(1987).
92. Id. at 429-30. This proposition was rejected by the Supreme Court's affirming
opinion. See 108 S. Ct. at 408.
93. 795 F.2d at 430.
94. Id. at 433-34.
95. See Max Daetwyler Corp. v. R. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 296-97 (3d Cir.), cert de-
nied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985); Buckeye Assoc. v. Fila Sports, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 1484, 1488
n.5 (D. Mass. 1985); see also Green, supra note 4, at 969-70 (stating that fifth amendment
standards should apply in cases involving federal service of process); Note, Alien Corpo-
rations, supra note 4, 474-78 (citing courts that have accepted aggregate contacts
analysis).
96. 355 F. Supp. 354 (W.D. Mich. 1973).
97. Id. at 356 (citing 46 US.C. §§ 761-68 (1982) (does not provide for nationwide
service)).
98. 355 F. Supp. at 356-57.
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States.99 Although the court stated that the defendant's contacts with the
state of Michigan were insufficient to satisfy fourteenth amendment stan-
dards,"00 its contacts with the United States were sufficient to allow the
Michigan federal court to assert personal jurisdiction.' 0 ' Although other
courts have used this test, its use appears confined mostly to cases where
the defendant is an alien.'
0 2
A Sixth Circuit case, Handley v. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co.,'
0 3
99. Id. at 357-58.
100. Id. at 358 n.5.
101. Id. at 358. In FTC v. Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981),
the Fifth Circuit used a "national contacts" standard. However, that decision did not
discuss the state long-arm statute because the court held that nationwide service existed
under the FTC Act. It is noteworthy that the court asserted jurisdiction on the basis of
contacts alone, finding it unnecessary to determine whether the forum was a fair one. Id.
at 253-58.
102. See Max Daetwyler Corp. v. R. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 294 (3d Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 US. 980 (1985); Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann, A.G.,
432 F. Supp. 659, 663-64 (D.N.H. 1977).
Several cases, however, expressly rejected the test. See, e.g., Wells Fargo & Co. v.
Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 418 (9th Cir. 1977) (determining that Rule 4(e)
compels measuring defendant's contacts with the forum state, not the United States,
when state long-arm statute is used) (quoting Edward J. Moriarty & Co. v. General Tire
& Rubber Co., 289 F. Supp. 381, 390 (S.D. Ohio 1967)); Ingersoll Milling Machine Co. v.
J.E. Bernand & Co., 508 F. Supp. 907, 910 n.4 (N.D. Il1. 1981) (declining to adopt the
aggregate contacts with the United States approach as being too broad). But see Catrone
v. Ogden Suffolk Downs, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 850 (D. Mass. 1986).
In Catrone, plaintiff sued both a corporate and an individual defendant, neither of
whom were aliens, alleging violations of federal antitrust law, 15 U S.C. §§ 1-7 (Sherman
Act), §§ 12-22 & 27 (Clayton Act), the Civil Rights Act, 42 U. S.C. § 1983, and state law.
647 F. Supp. at 852. Defendants claimed that the court lacked personal jurisdiction. Id.
at 852. The district court, citing precedent from the Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit, stated that "[p]ersonal jurisdiction in federal question cases is a matter of federal
law, to be governed by the due process standards of the Fifth Amendment rather than the
Fourteenth Amendment.... The First Circuit has adopted the 'nationwide contacts'
approach to personal jurisdiction in federal question cases." Id. at 852-53 (citing Driver
v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Stafford v.
Briggs, 444 US. 527 (1980)); see, e.g., Johnson Creative Arts, Inc. v. Wool Masters, Inc.,
743 F.2d 947 (Ist Cir. 1984); Trans-Asiatic Oil Ltd. v. Apex Oil Co., 743 F.2d 956 (1st
Cir. 1984). Since the antitrust statute at issue in Catrone contained a nationwide service
of process provision, the court applied the fifth amendment "nationwide contacts" test
and found the corporate defendants amenable to process even though they were not
aliens. Catrone, 647 F. Supp. at 856.
The district court did not apply the fifth amendment test to the individual defendants,
however, because the nationwide service of process provisions expressly apply to corpo-
rate defendants only. Id. at 856 (citing 15 US.C. § 22 (1982) (§ 12 of the Clayton Act)).
The federal civil rights statute, which did apply to the individual defendants, did not
contain a nationwide service provision. See id. at 856 & n.4. Consequently, the court
looked to Rule 4, which it found referred it to Massachusetts' long-arm statute. Id. at
856. It interpreted Rule 4, however, not only as limiting the court to the circumstances of
the state long-arm statute, but also as incorporating fourteenth amendment standards of
due process. Id. at 855, 856. The court went on to find that the individual defendants
were not amenable to the court's jurisdiction because neither the Massachusetts statute
nor the fourteenth amendement permitted jurisdiction. Id. at 857-60.
103. 732 F.2d 1265 (6th Cir. 1984).
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brought under the Jones Act,"° used a different analysis. Plaintiff served
defendant pursuant to the Kentucky long-arm statute. The court first
determined that state statutory requirements had been met.'0 5 Then it
analyzed the constitutionality of jurisdiction in this federal question case,
and, after arguing that the minimum contacts standard should be applied
flexibly, it actually looked at whether the assertion of jurisdiction was
fundamentally unfair under a fifth amendment standard." 6 The Han-
dley court, however, measured fairness by looking at whether the defend-
ant would "reasonably anticipate" being sued in the forum state.1 7 This
test, in effect, is closer to the fourteenth amendment contacts test than to
the reasonableness or fairness test under the fifth amendment. 08 In the
Third Circuit, Judge Gibbons' dissent in DeJames v. Magnificence Carri-
ers, Inc. 109 argued for a similar test.
The disparities in the federal decisions discussed above stem from two
sources. First, courts disagree as to what standard, if any, Rule 4 incor-
porates. 10 Those courts choosing a fifth amendment standard should
note that Rule 4(e) does not proscribe the application of state law to
federal question cases. Thus, it is not reasonable to assume that state
long-arm statutes are irrelevant to a Rule 4(e) analysis in a federal ques-
tion case, as the courts did in Terry v. Raymond International, Inc. "'
and Holt v. Klosters Rederi A/S."2 At a minimum, whatever limits are
104. Id. at 1267 (citing 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976) (does not provide for nationwide
service)).
105. Id. at 1271. In Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff& Co., 108 S. Ct. 404 (1987),
the Supreme Court gave as a reason for granting certiorari "a possible conflict with views
of the Sixth Circuit expressed in [Handley]." Id. at 4032. In view of the Court's decision,
this is curious. The Court held that Rule 4(e) requires the district court to look first to
the state long-arm statute to decide whether jurisdiction exists. Id. at 4033. The Court
expressly declined to reach the question of the appropriate constitutional standard. Id. at
4033 n.5. Since Handley also looked first to the state long-arm statute, the conflict with
the Fifth Circuit's approach in Omni Capital is not apparent.
106. Handley v. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co., 732 F.2d 1265, 1271-72 (6th Cir.
1984).
107. Id. at 1272.
108. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
109. 654 F.2d 280, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1981) (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (fifth amendment
requires only that forum be fair and reasonable, and defendant only need have "national"
contacts, as opposed to contacts with forum's locale).
110. See supra notes 71-94 and accompanying text.
111. 658 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981). In Terry, the court looked only to the
"fairness test" that it said governed amenability in a federal question case. See id. at 402-
03. When the party in question asserted that Louisiana's long-arm statute did not cover
the act in question because the amenability contacts were not related to the claim, the
court stated that "this objection is beside the point. The company's amenability to pro-
cess is established under the federal standard of International Shoe. Federal law elimi-
nates any need to determine whether [the company] was amenable under the Louisiana
long arm statute." Id. at 403.
112. 355 F. Supp. 354, 356-58 (W.D. Mich. 1973) (holding that federal, not state, law
is controlling in a federal question case). Indeed, the Supreme Court found in Omni
Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 108 S. Ct. 404, 410 (1987), that "under Rule 4(e), a
federal court, [in deciding a case under the federal securities laws and the Commodity
Exchange Act,] normally looks either to a federal statute or to the long-arm statute of the
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imposed as a matter of state law are incorporated by the terms of the
Rule. State statutes vary widely, and most of them explicitly require
contacts with the state in order to obtain jurisdiction. II Typically, the
legislature or the state court of last resort has declared that the statute
was intended to be interpreted as broadly as possible-to go to the limits
of due process-thus limiting jurisdiction only to the extent required by
the Constitution.' 1
4
In states that do interpret their long-arm statutes as going to the fed-
eral constitutional limits of due process,"5 however, a federal court de-
ciding a federal question case should examine the fifth amendment due
process standard because the fourteenth amendment is a due process lim-
itation placed by the federal Constitution on state power; Rule 4 should
not incorporate limitations placed by the federal Constitution on state
power, because Rule 4 refers only to those limitations set by the state
itself.'1 6 Furthermore, since Rule 4 incorporates state law, state interests
already are amply represented, eliminating the need for a fourteenth
amendment standard. The extensive authority of the federal govern-
ment, which reaches broadly across state lines, contrasted with a state's
legitimate right to assert power which ends at its borders, provides an-
other reason for the application of a fifth amendment standard that ac-
State in which it sits to determine whether a defendant is amenable to service." Id. at
410.
113. See, e.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, 2-209 (Smith-Hurd 1983); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-
75.4 (1983). The California long-arm statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10 (West 1973),
seems to be an exception. It states that jurisdiction is proper whenever the state or fed-
eral constitutions would permit it. See id. The California statute incorporates whatever
state constitutional restrictions exist, but they appear to be no different from federal con-
stitutional restrictions. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10 (Vest 1973); see also Walker v.
University Books, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 126, 128 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (court stated that state
constitution "indicates 'an intent to exercise the broadest possible jurisdiction' consistent
with the due process clause of the federal Constitution") (quoting Michigan Nat'l Bank v.
Superior Ct., 23 Cal. App. 3d 1, 6, 99 Cal. Rptr. 823, 826 (1972)).
114. See, e.g., Giotis v. Apollo of the Ozarks, Inc., 800 F.2d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 1986)
("reach of [the statute] is intended to be coextensive with the requirements of due pro-
cess") (citing Stevens v. White Motor Corp., 77 Wis. 2d 64, 74, 252 N.W.2d 88, 93
(1977)), cerL denied, 107 S. Ct. 1303 (1987); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 436, 176 N.E.2d 761, 763 (1961) (Illinois statute contem-
plates extension of jurisdiction to limits of due process) (citing Nelson v. Miller. 11 111. 2d
378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957)). But see Masonite Corp. v. Hellenic Lines, 412 F. Supp.
434, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (New York's long-arm statute does not extend jurisdiction to
its "fullest limits"); Escambia Treating Co. v. Otto Candies, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 1235, 1236
(N.D. Fla. 1975) (Florida's long-arm statute requires "more than the contacts necessary
to satisfy due process"). The Illinois courts, however, may have had a change of heart.
See Giotis, 800 F.2d at 665 n.2. By drafting a long-arm statute to "go to the limits of due
process," legislatures put no specific limits on its interpretation. The best example of
such a statute is Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10 (West 1973).
115. See, eg., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10 (West 1973); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 801.05
(West 1977).
116. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e). Rule 4(e) explicitly provides that when a state statute or
rule allows service on a person who is not an inhabitant of the state, then service is
limited to the circumstances set out in the statute or rule itself. It does not suggest that
the court also look to limits that the federal constitution places on state power. See id.
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commodates nationwide interests.' 17
When states do not interpret their statutes as going to the federal con-
stitutional limits of due process, Rule 4's provision that courts apply
state jurisdictional limits requires that federal courts deciding federal
questions respect specific statutory limits. 1 8 Thus, if the statute does not
allow for a contract made with a non-resident to function as the basis for
jurisdiction, the federal court would have to respect that limitation, even
if, in other categories, such as torts committed by non-residents, the stat-
ute goes to the federal constitutional limits of due process.
Admittedly, the relationship of a defendant with a state will govern, at
least in part, the defendant's amenability to process in a federal question
case. It would be anomalous to conclude, however, that the Supreme
Court in drafting, or Congress in passing Rule 4(e), intended that federal
interests be ignored in favor of purely state concerns when deciding ame-
nability issues in federal question cases. 9 Certainly Congress should
eliminate this anomaly.
The second source of the disparity in federal decisions, developed in
Part III within, is that even in those cases where courts adopt a fifth
amendment standard, they disagree on the substance of that standard. 2
117. For example, in Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 US. 761 (1945), the Court
overturned a state regulation limiting the length of railroad trains passing through the
state. Distinguishing earlier cases upholding a state's right to impose "full crew" require-
ments, the Court noted that "[the full train crew laws] had no effects outside the state
beyond those of picking up and setting down the extra employees at the state boundaries;
they involved no wasted use of facilities or serious impairment of transportation effi-
ciency, which are among the factors of controlling weight here." Id. at 782; see also
Davis v. Farmers Coop. Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312, 315 (1923) (Court held that Minnesota
statute subjecting corporation to jurisdiction on basis of soliciting agent's presence, with-
out regard to any business done, violated commerce clause).
More recently, the Court has stated:
For a State to tax income generated in interstate commerce, the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes two requirements: a "minimal
connection" between the interstate activities and the taxing State, and a rational
relationship between the income attributed to the State and the intrastate values
of the enterprise.
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 436-37 (1980); see also Curry v.
McCanless, 307 US. 357, 364 (1939) (tangible property generally only taxable by state
where it is located). The proposition that a state's authority ends at its borders is consis-
tent with the territorial limitations placed on state long-arm statutes by the current due
process test. See infra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
118. For an example of a statute which falls short of due process limits, see N.Y. Civ.
Prac. L. & R. § 302 (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1988). See Lavie v. Marketscope Research
Co., 71 Misc. 2d 373, 374, 336 N.Y.S.2d 97, 99 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (in dicta, court noted New
York chose not to exhaust "full potential" of jurisdiction permissible under the federal
Constitution).
For examples of statutes listing categories of contacts, see N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R.
§ 302 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988) (including transacting business in the state, the
commission of certain tortious acts within the state or without the state that cause injury,
an interest in real property located in the state); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4 (1983) (includ-
ing local presence, injury, service, property, marital relationship).
119. See Green, supra note 4, at 982-83.
120. See infra Part III.
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B. Rule 4(e), Diversity and a Fourteenth Amendment Standard
In diversity cases, courts seem to assume, with little or no analysis,
that fourteenth amendment standards apply to the constitutional analysis
ofjurisdiction. z' They base this assumption on Rule 4(e), which permits
extraterritorial service pursuant to any applicable federal statute and
"under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed" by the laws of
the state in which the district court sits. 122 Thus, courts have accepted
state fourteenth amendment standards as appropriate.
One should question, however, whether courts apply the fourteenth
amendment amenability standard as a matter of convenience since it is a
well-known standard that, on the surface, seems reasonably applicable,
or whether Rule 4 or other federal law mandates the application of four-
teenth amendment standards. 1 2
3
Justice Powell discussed the amenability standard for diversity cases in
his concurring opinion in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des
Bauxites de Guinee.1 24 In Bauxites, a diversity action, the district court
exercised jurisdiction to enable it to sanction the defendant for failure to
comply with discovery orders concerning jurisdiction. 125 Without much
analysis, the majority of the Court upheld the finding as a valid exercise
of the district court's authority consistent with due process."2 6
Justice Powell, in his concurrence, first asserted that since no federal
121. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 US. 462, 471-78 (1985) (applying
fourteenth amendment minimum contacts test); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 US.
770, 774 (1984) (same).
122. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
123. The history of Rule 4 is not particularly illustrative. It seems clear that the 1963
amendments were intended to allow an expansion of personal jurisdiction exercised by
the federal courts by permitting the use of state long-arm statutes. The advisory commit-
tee notes to the rule state that
[t]he second sentence [of the rule], added by [the 1963] amendment, expressly
allows resort in original Federal actions to the procedures provided by State law
for effecting service on nonresident parties ....
... [T]here appears to be no reason for denying plaintiffs means of commenc-
ing actions in Federal courts which are generally available in the State courts.
Fed R. Civ. P. 4 advisory committee notes.
It is not clear that the advisory committee intended to deal comprehensively with the
problem of federal interests in a diversity case. The Advisory Committee specifically
refers to jurisdiction by attachment but otherwise does not discuss the implications of the
amendment comprehensively. Presumably, the drafters did not consider that federal
courts treat jurisdiction in a diversity case any differently than a state court would.
Otherwise, there likely would have been some discussion of Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph
Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960), in the advisory committee notes. In Jaftex, a
Second Circuit panel held that federal law determined amenability to jurisdiction even in
a diversity case. See id. at 516. The committee's silence on the issue suggests that it
supported the contrary view subsequently taken by the Second Circuit in Arrowsmith v.
United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 1963).
124. 456 US. 694, 709-16 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring).
125. See id. at 698-99; ia at 711 (Powell, J., concurring).
126. See id. at 709.
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long-arm statute existed, the Rules of Decision Act'2 7 and Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins'28 required the use of state law in diversity cases. He
then reasoned that because state law determined the jurisdictional reach
of a court, "[the federal court's] jurisdiction... normally would be sub-
ject to the same due process limitations as a state court."'1 2 9
The Rules of Decision Act, however, does not clearly mandate this
conclusion. Although Rule 4 requires that specific limitations on the ex-
ercise of jurisdiction imposed by the state statutes be respected, the due
process limitations on those statutes usually are imposed as a matter of
federal constitutional law, stemming from the fourteenth amendment's
restrictions on state power.130 Even assuming that the Rules of Decision
Act is applicable, it does not follow that federal constitutional limitations
imposed on state laws apply when the federal government, and not the
state, is attempting to enforce due process. 131
Moreover, Rule 4 seems to incorporate the state long-arm statute by
its terms. Thus, the Rules of Decision Act would not apply. If anything,
the question is whether, under the Rules Enabling Act, 132 the Bauxite
Court acted properly. Because Rule 4 incorporates existing state stan-
dards, it does not "abridge, enlarge or modify a substantive right,"' 3 3 as
is prohibited by the Rules Enabling Act.' 34 Viewing it otherwise would
assume that the defendant has a "substantive right" embodied in the par-
ticular due process standard invoked. Initially, the notion that jurisdic-
tional interests are "substantive" is at least open to debate., 35 More
important, however, the applicable due process limit is set by the Consti-
127. 28 US.C. § 1652 (1982) (requiring that federal courts apply state law unless the
Constitution, treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress require otherwise); see
Bauxites, 456 US. at 711 (Powell, J., concurring).
128. 304 US. 64 (1938); see Bauxites, 456 US. at 711 (Powell, J., concurring).
129. Bauxites, 456 US. at 712 (Powell, J., concurring).
130. See Berger, supra note 4, at 310-18.
131. In most situations outside the realm of jurisdictional due process, the issue will
not arise because a federal due process standard under the fifth amendment would oper-
ate identically to the fourteenth amendment standard. See infra note 171 and accompa-
nying text. Jurisdiction is unique, however, in that the due process concept is tied, in
part, to a particular territorial entity by the requirement of "contacts" or "purposeful
availment." See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293-94
(1980). Thus the standard will change according to the territorial entity against which
"contacts" are viewed.
132. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982) provides that the Supreme Court has the power to pre-
scribe rules governing federal court procedure and process, and that "[s]uch rules shall
not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right." Id.
133. Id.
134. See supra note 132.
135. Justice Harlan believed that a "substantive" right could be defined by the rules
that "substantially affect those primary decisions respecting human conduct which our
constitutional system leaves to state regulation." See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 US. 460, 475
(1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). Because jurisdiction does not go to the merits of the case
or the remedy, but rather to an apportionment of cases within the system, it could be
described as procedural. On the other hand, as recognized in World- Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, individuals might organize their activities so as to enable some predict-
ability as to where that conduct will render them subject to jurisdiction. 444 U.S. 286, 297
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tution, not Rule 4, and the constitutional limits on federal power stem
from the fifth amendment, not the fourteenth amendment which limits
state power.' 3
6
In addition, in diversity actions it is the federal government, not the
state, that is denying due process. The federal government provides the
forum for the plaintiff under a federal statute. Although the requirement
in Rule 4 that state law be applied may cause the problem, the provision
for diversity jurisdiction creates the compulsion.
Thus, a fifth amendment jurisdictional standard should be applied
even in diversity cases. As discussed in the next section, this analysis
does not ignore state-oriented concerns underlying the fourteenth
amendment analysis; it simply weighs relevant federal interests in the
balance.
(1980). Such activities could be within the spirit, at least, of Justice Harlan's formulation
of "substantive" rights.
136. Justice Powell cited Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir.
1963), to support the notion that fourteenth amendment standards apply in diversity
cases. World-Wide Volkswagen, 456 US. at 711-12 & n.3. Arrowsmith, however, does
not really answer that issue. In Arrowsmith, the Second Circuit focused on whether, in
the absence of congressional direction, a federal court could fashion its own long-arm
rules. 320 F.2d at 226. Judge Friendly in Arrowsmith viewed the International Shoe
standard as part of the state statute. He stated that "[t]he decision of what contacts,
within the constitutionally permitted sphere, shall suffice to make a [defendant] ... sub-
ject to suit is one for the state to make in the first instance." Arrowsmith, 320 F.2d at 229.
He further stated that "jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is to be determined
here on the basis of constitutionally valid [state]... law." Id. at 231. But that statement
begs the question. Whether the statute is applied constitutionally is a matter of federal
law and thus such a determination ought to reflect the context in which the question is
raised-in this case, a restraint on the assertion of authority by a federal court. There-
fore, a fifth amendment standard should apply. Rule 4(e), which was added after Arrow-
smith, represents a congressional mandate to use the state statute in the area of personal
jurisdiction, but it does not by its terms incorporate a particular constitutional standard
with which to judge the assertion of authority. In the author's view, statements, such as
the one in Burstein v. State Bar, 693 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1982). that Rule 4(e) incorporates
fourteenth amendment standards are simply wrong. Id. at 523.
Curiously, Justice Powell gives cursory attention to Rule 4 and seems to assume that
the use of state long-arm statutes is the result of something other than a congressional
direction via Rule 4. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites de
Guinee 456 US. 694, 711 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring) ("[Ijn the absence of a federal
rule or statute ... personal jurisdiction.., is determined in diversity cases by the law of
the forum State.") (emphasis added).
Presumably, Congress could pass a long-arm statute that pertained to diversity cases.
The only possible major obstacle to such a statute would arise from a finding that the
constitutional principles underlying Erie somehow prevent an abridgement of the states'
rights to decide which defendants are subject to the authority of their courts. This seems
a tenuous proposition at best. See Arrowsmith, 320 F.2d at 226 ("[Erie] would not pre-
vent Congress or its rule-making delegate from authorizing a district court to assume
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation in an ordinary diversity case although the state
court would not .. "). But cf Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 US. 535, 538 (1949)
(federal jurisdiction could not be maintained in diversity case in which the state would
not permit jurisdiction); Angel v. Bullington, 330 US. 183, 192-93 (1947) (upholding use
of state "door closing" statutes in diversity cases).
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III. SUBSTANCE OF A FIFTH AMENDMENT STANDARD
Assuming that a fifth amendment standard is appropriate for federal
cases, jurisdictional analysis should fall within the traditional due process
scheme.
A. A Comparison of Jurisdictional Due Process Interests with the
Interests of Traditional Due Process Analysis
The Supreme Court has identified several due process interests relating
to personal jurisdiction. The "liberty interest" is central to jurisdictional
analysis and to much of traditional due process analysis.'37 In Bauxites,
for example, the Court asserted that the defendant has a liberty interest
emanating from the due process clause that limits the state court's asser-
tion ofjurisdiction. 13s More recent opinions have reiterated this belief.'39
Other due process interests relating to personal jurisdiction noted by the
Court include "the burden on the defendant, . . . the plaintiff's interest in
obtaining convenient and effective relief,... the interstate judicial sys-
tem's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies;
and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental
substantive social policies."' 4°
Clearly, however, the first step in the traditional jurisdictional due pro-
cess analysis-an assessment of contacts-is a measure of state authority
or power to overcome the defendant's liberty interest, and predominates
over the other considerations of fairness and efficiency.' 4' In most non-
jurisdictional situations involving constitutional issues where a "liberty
interest" is at stake, that interest is termed fundamental,' 42 which re-
137. See infra notes 138-39 and accompanying text (liberty interest in jurisdiction
analysis); infra notes 142-43 and accompanying text (liberty interest in traditional due
process analysis).
138. Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,
702-03 & n.10 (1982).
139. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985); Keeton
v. Hustler Magazine, 465 US. 770, 782 (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring).
140. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 US. 286, 292 (1980) (citations
omitted).
141. In Burger King, although the Court acknowledged that fairness factors must be
considered, its opinion made it plain that those factors rarely would overcome a finding of
contacts. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 482-84; see also World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 US.
at 292. In Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, at least some Justices determined that
jurisdiction was unfair, despite the existence of contacts. 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1035 (1987)
(Brennan, J., concurring); see also id. at 1038 (Stevens, J., concurring).
142. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is used to protect fundamen-
tal rights, primarily those delineated in the Bill of Rights. See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400, 404 (1965) (noting "the belief of the Framers of those liberties and safeguards
[in the Bill of Rights] that confrontation was a fundamental right essential to a fair trial
in a criminal prosecution"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US. 479, 485 (1965) (right of
privacy in marriage is "within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental consti-
tutional guarantees"); Gitlow v. New York, 268 US. 652, 666 (1925) (freedom of speech
and of the press are fundamental personal rights and liberties protected by the fourteenth
amendment). Justice Harlan, however, viewed the due process clause as broadly protect-
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quires that the state show a compelling interest sufficient to outweigh the
defendant's liberty interest. 4 ' In the jurisdictional context, however,
when analyzing whether the state has sufficient interest to overcome the
defendant's liberty interest, the Supreme Court does not treat the liberty
interest as a fundamental interest because it fails to discuss it within a
compelling-interest framework. 1
B. Traditional Due Process Analysis
1. Procedural Due Process
Current due process analysis is divided into "procedural" and "sub-
stantive" areas.14 5 Current procedural due process analysis crystallized
in Mathews v. Eldridge,'46 where the Supreme Court articulated a three-
factor balancing test."' The Mathews formulation pits the government's
interests in the regulatory mechanism against the private interests at
stake and the value of protecting those interests.
48
While some observers have placed jurisdictional analysis in the proce-
dural due process camp, 149 the Mathews model is not transposed easily
ing the "basic values 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'" Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 US. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
143. See, eg., Griswold, 381 US. at 497; Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 US. 516, 524
(1960).
144. See, e.g., Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456
US. 694, 702-03 n.10 (1982) (stating that the defendant has a liberty interest restricting
jurisdiction, but not analyzing that interest as fundamental, nor requiring that the state
have a compelling interest to overcome it).
145. Roughly speaking, "procedural" due process is concerned with whether the
mechanisms by which a decision is arrived at are appropriate and fair, but it does not
concern whether the substantive rule of law is fair. "Substantive" due process concerns
whether the substantive rule is fair. See generally R. Rotunda, 1. Nowak, T. Young,
Treatise on Constitutional Law, § 10.6, at 321-23 (1986) (comparing procedural with
substantive due process).
146. 424 US. 319 (1976).
147. Id. at 334-35. The Court stated that:
our prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates of due
process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the pri-
vate interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal




149. See 2 R. Rotunda, J. Nowak, T. Young, supra note 9, § 17.8, at 252 n.10. This
treatise puts its brief discussion of jurisdiction under the procedural due process heading,
but does not discuss it in terms of the other procedural due process cases. Presumably, it
was so catalogued because jurisdiction does not deal with the underlying rule of decision
in the case. See Crawford v. Minutemen Gourmet Foods, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 181, 182
(N.D. Ala. 1980) (court finds that "it may exercise personal jurisdiction . . .without
exceeding the limits of procedural due process"); Coe & Payne Co. v. Wood-Mosaic
Corp., 230 Ga. 58, 60, 195 S.E.2d 399, 401 (1973) (adopting Illinois' interpretation of its
similarly worded long-arm statute, court noted "'that the Long Arm Statute [of Illinois]
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into the jurisdiction area. Mathews suggests that the costs of creating
adequate procedures to avoid erroneous results must be balanced against
the risk of error.15° The minimization of risk of error addresses fairness
to the party. With jurisdictional issues, however, the risk of an erroneous
result in the underlying action is peripheral. In fact, risk of error is not
calculated in the jurisdictional result. Furthermore, unlike procedural
due process analysis, jurisdictional analysis is not keyed to the mecha-
nism by which the decision is reached, but rather to the substance of the
jurisdictional issue itself.
2. Substantive Due Process
Superficially, at least, jurisdictional analysis seems to have more in
common with substantive due process than with procedural due process.
Both appear to deal with the fairness of the underlying result, rather than
with the mechanism used to get there.
Precise comparisons are difficult, however, because there is no single,
accepted substantive due process analysis. Some courts have purported
to use a "threshold" analysis in cases where they find that a "fundamen-
tal right" is at issue, employing a heightened scrutiny test to determine
whether the government's interest is strong enough to overcome the due
process liberty interest. 151 In many other cases, including some challeng-
ing a governmental regulation as "unfair," the Court has said that the
government, to overcome any due process interest, need show only a ra-
tional basis for its action.' 52 Most typically, these cases challenge eco-
nomic regulations. 53  In still other substantive due process cases, a
continuous balancing test seems to be used whereby no threshold govern-
mental interest is necessary; the court balances whatever interests the
contemplates that jurisdiction shall be exercised over non-resident parties to the maxi-
mum extent permitted by procedural due process' ") (quoting Gray v. American Radia-
tor & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 436, 176 N.E.2d 761, 763 (1961). But see
Scott v. Ford Ord Federal Credit Union (In re G. Weeks Securities, Inc.), 5 Bankr. 220,
225 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1980) (discussing personal jurisdiction under the fifth amend-
ment as a matter of substantive due process).
150. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 US. 319, 341-42 (1976) (citing Fusari v. Steinberg, 419
U.S. 379, 389 (1975)).
151. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685-86 (1977) (citing Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154-56 (1973)) (right to privacy cannot be abridged absent a
"sufficiently compelling" state interest). As these and other cases demonstrate, the
heightened scrutiny test is used largely in what might be termed "procreative privacy"
cases.
152. See, e.g., Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 US. 214 (1985),
where the "right" deprived was one to retake a medical board examination. Id. at 509.
The Court stated that a due process violation would require a showing that the student's
rejection was irrational or beyond reasoned, academic decision-making. Id. at 514-15 &
n.13; see also id. at 515-16 (Powell, J., concurring) (interests asserted did not rise to the
level of substantive due process); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 US. 144, 147-
48, 152 (1938) (legislative regulation presumed supported unless it fails to rest on a ra-
tional basis).




government has against whatever interests the individual has."
These varied analyses make comparison with jurisdictional issues diffi-
cult. There is a resemblance between the two-step analysis for jurisdic-
tional questions' 55 and the threshold approach to substantive due process
questions. In both, the government must meet some threshold to over-
come the due process interest at stake.'5 6 Jurisdiction, however, adds the
step of analyzing the fairness of the exercise of jurisdiction and the rea-
sonableness of the forum. On the other hand, this second step in jurisdic-
tion cases encompasses a balancing approach similar to the balance used
in some substantive due process cases.15 7
Last, a fairly striking difference emerges. The due process tests,
whether threshold or balancing, expressly incorporate governmental in-
terests as a major feature of the analysis, whereas in jurisdictional analy-
sis, the government's interest is considered, if at all, only after contacts
have been found. Consequently, mere presence of the defendant may not
be sufficient to give the sovereign authority to entertain the litigation. 5 8
Rather, a defendant gives up his right to dispute the assertion of author-
ity if he has sufficient contacts, even if the sovereign would care little
about those contacts. Similarly, a plaintiff may invoke sovereign author-
ity, even where the sovereign might be deemed indifferent to doing so
itself.
IV. THE PROPOSED TEST FOR PERSONAL JURISDICTION: A
THRESHOLD-PLUS-BALANCING APPROACH
The best way to reconcile the sovereign power or "contacts" approach
with other due process tests is to analyze jurisdiction under a threshold-
plus-balancing approach, combining the threshold governmental inter-
ests expressed in the substantive due process analysis, with the other in-
154. See Developments in the Law, the Constitution and the Family, 93 Harv. L. Rev.
1156, 1195 (1980) [hereinafter Developments] (describing flexible balancing approach
used in due process analysis); cf. Treiman, Equal Protection and Fundamental Rights--A
Judicial Shell Game, 15 Tulsa L.J. 183, 223 (1980) (discussing balancing test used by the
Court in fundamental rights cases analyzed as equal protection problems). The authors
of Developments, supra, noted that the Court has used both substantive due process and
equal protection language in its fundamental rights cases. Id. at 1193.
155. See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text (substantive due process threshold
test); text accompanying notes 25-26 (analysis of defendant's contacts and other
interests).
157. See supra text accompanying note 154 (balancing government interests against
individual interests).
158. Whether a defendant's mere presence in a forum is sufficient to grant jurisdiction
remains unanswered after Shaffer v. Heitner, World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
and Burger King v. Rudzewicz. Compare O'Brien v. Eubanks, 701 P.2d 614, 616 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1984) ("Where... service is made upon a natural person found within the state,
the minimum contacts analysis is inapplicable."), cert. denied, 474 US. 904 (1985), with
Duehring v. Vasquez, 490 So. 2d 667, 671 (La. Ct. App. 1986) ("[m]ere service of process
upon a nonresident defendant transiently within the state is no longer sufficient to satisfy
due process standards").
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terests' 59 presented in the jurisdictional due process analysis. Under the
threshold arm of the proposed test, the interests of the state in asserting
its authority to force the defendant to litigate in the state substitute for
the "contacts" analysis used in Burger King and World-Wide Volk-
swagen. ' The focus of the current jurisdictional due process analysis on
the defendant's contacts requires this substitution because current analy-
sis causes courts to neglect governmental interests.' 6 1 The proposed test,
159. See supra text accompanying notes 137 & 140.
160. The idea that the "forum state interest" should play a role in jurisdictional analy-
sis is disputed by Professor Harold Lewis. See Lewis, The "Forum State Interest" Factor
in Personal Jurisdiction Adjudication: Home-Court Horses Hauling Constitutional Carts,
33 Mercer L. Rev. 769 (1982). His premise is that "the sole proper concern of due process
... is to assure the parties a fair forum." Id. at 771. Even conceding that point, objective
fairness must be taken in context. Being "fair" to a defendant, for instance, by giving
greater weight to her right to be left alone, may be "unfair" to a plaintiff in some cases
because it could deprive the plaintiff of a convenient forum. If the definition of "fairness"
is no more than a reflection of a balancing of interests, then the analysis functionally may
not be all that dissimilar to the one proposed here. But the insistence that state interests
are not a legitimate part of the analysis seems to belie that conclusion. Because the state
is depriving the defendant of due process, the state should have the burden of proof in
setting forth the countervailing interests.
Perhaps Professor Lewis' reasoning stems from the peculiar nature of constitutional
jurisdiction analysis. Recently, the Supreme Court has described the analysis as one of
due process implicated by the possible deprivation of a liberty interest belonging to the
defendant. Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 US.
694, 702-03 n.10 (1982). In many due process cases not involving jurisdiction, the indi-
vidual whose rights are being infringed sues the state. In a jurisdiction case, however, the
liberty infringement constitutes a subordinate part of a litigation between private parties.
Thus, the plaintiff becomes the champion of the state's interest. At the same time, plain-
tiff's own selfish interests in upholding jurisdiction, which may or may not correspond to
the state's interest, will also be at stake.
A due process analysis also has been used in private litigation. See North Georgia
Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 US. 601, 606 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,
416 US. 600, 607 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 US. 67, 84 (1972). Those cases involved
purely private litigation, but in each it was alleged that the prejudgment attachment stat-
utes denied due process to the parties whose property was attached. In resolving these
disputes, the Court examined the state interest involved in these statutes: protecting
creditors from defaulting debtors. See North Georgia Finishing, Inc., 419 US. at 601-03;
Mitchell, 416 US. at 608; Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 78-79, 92-93. It is harder to ascribe a
strong state interest to the location of an essentially private litigation.
Possibly Professor Lewis is concerned that overindulgence of the state's interest will
result in a lack of concern for plaintiff's interest in protecting his choice of forum. See
Lewis, supra at 810. Under the test proposed by this Article, the interest of the plaintiff
in a convenient forum would be protected by considering the state's interest. It is ques-
tionable whether the failure of a state to provide a convenient forum is a deprivation of
due process if plaintiff has no recognized liberty or property right to such a forum. At
most, the analysis of defendant's due process right against the state should consider
whether granting such a right would harm other parties, such as the plaintiff. Because of
the way jurisdictional due process cases arise, this merely adds a factor not present in
other due process cases.
161. Consider Point Landing, Inc. v. Omni Capital Int'l, 795 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1986)
(en banc) (per curiam), aff'd sub nom. Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 108 S.
Ct. 404 (1987). The original action alleged securities fraud (for which a nationwide ser-
vice statute exists) against several defendants, including some foreign ones. Id. at 417-18.
After the Supreme Court indicated that a private right of action existed under the Com-
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however, provides a means of invoking overriding governmental con-
cerns, should they exist, at the threshold level, even if a defendant has
only a tenuous connection to the forum. Viewing jurisdiction from a
state interest162 point of view allows courts to ask whether the state cares
enough about this litigation to permit the plaintiff to invoke the authority
of its courts. The proposed test incorporates the factors included in the
jurisdiction analysis that are not a part of traditional due process
analysis.
Fleshing out this proposal requires examination of the defendant's in-
terests in the jurisdictional scheme, the constitutional threshold interest
that the government must cross to overcome that interest, and other fac-
tors that weigh in the balance once the threshold is met.
A. Defendant's Due Process Interests
The defendant has several due process interests at stake. First, the
modity Exchange Act, plaintiffs asserted a claim under that statute. Id. at 418. The
Commodity Exchange Act does not have a jurisdictional section. 7 U S.C. §§ 1-24
(1982). The Fifth Circuit dismissed the securities claim, which provides for nationwide
service, as preempted by the commodities claim, making the nationwide service provision
of the securities statute inapplicable. 795 F.2d at 419. Suddenly, the same facts that
implicated federal interests sufficient to warrant nationwide service were measured only
against local interests under Rule 4(e). Given the similarities between commodities fraud
actions and securities fraud actions, and the similar governmental interests in prosecuting
(or not prosecuting) frauds perpetuated by foreign parties, it is strange to ignore those
interests completely simply because the statutory basis of jurisdiction has changed.
162. The use of a state's interest is not completely foreign to the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction vocabulary. In Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 US. 770 (1984), the Court
stated: "We agree that the 'fairness' of haling respondent into a New Hampshire court
depends to some extent on whether respondent's activities relating to New Hampshire are
such as to give that State a legitimate interest in holding respondent answerable on a
claim related to those activities." Id. at 775-76. The Court stated that deterring non-
residents from committing torts within the state and "discourag[ing] the deception of its
citizens" with libelous material are major interests. Id. at 776. On the other hand, the
Court dismissed the state's interest in applying its law, noting that "such choice-of-law
concerns should [not] complicate or distort the jurisdictional inquiry." Id. at 778.
Thus, the nature of the forum state interest was not subjected to rigorous analysis in
Keeton, perhaps because the Court viewed it as a fairly simple case. It is also noteworthy
that Justice Brennan, the author of the Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz opinion, dis-
avowed the forum state interest aspects of the cases except "to the extent that they bear
upon the liberty interests of the respondent." Id. at 782 (Brennan, J., concurring). In-
deed, in Burger King, the Court relegated the forum state's interest to the list of factors
considered after contacts are established. 471 US. 462, 476-77 (1985). Nevertheless, the
Court did recognize that Florida's interests (at least in protecting its citizens) were rele-
vant to the jurisdictional inquiry. Id. at 482-83.
In the reasonableness portion of its opinion in Asahi Metal Indus Co. v. Superior
Court, the Court also discussed state interests. See 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1034-35 (1987). The
Court noted that once the main suit had been settled, the remaining indemnification dis-
pute between two foreign companies was hardly one in which California had an interest.
Id. at 1034. Interestingly, the Court, in its discussion of state interests, raised the ques-
tion of whether California law would apply but did not state that this was a factor to be
considered. Id.
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defendant has a privacy interest in being left alone. 163 A complaint sim-
ply represents a set of unproven allegations. Although society's interest
in dispute resolution sometimes requires that defendants answer errone-
ous charges, they should not be forced to go a long way to do so. Pri-
marily for historical reasons, "a long way" is defined here in terms of
state boundaries, even when a defendant lives close to the border of the
forum state. People tend to think of themselves as living in a particular
state."6 Having to defend in another state raises questions of bias
against out-of-state residents, even, and perhaps especially, in areas close
to state borders. 165 Thus, some justification exists for connecting the indi-
vidual interest with state boundaries. In some cases, however, an indi-
vidual should have a recognized interest against being dragged into
another area of his home state. Such intra-state bias is not unknown,
but, for reasons discussed below, this is unlikely to affect drastically liti-
gation within a state. 166
Defendants also have an interest in being able to organize their activi-
ties to avoid litigation in certain places. 167 This interest is more tenuous
because a defendant should not be permitted to determine unilaterally
where disputes will be resolved. 16' Nevertheless, one should be able to
control one's destiny within reason. At a minimum, the defendant
should not be forced to litigate in a surprising forum. 169
The Court has not articulated clearly what level of scrutiny it assigns
163. In Olmstead v. United States, 277 US. 438 (1928), overruled on other grounds,
Katz v. United States, 389 US. 347, 352 (1967), Justice Brandeis wrote that "[the framers
of the Constitution] conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Id. at 478
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). See also Carey v. Brown, 447 US. 455, 471 (1980); Doe v.
Bolton, 410 US. 179, 213 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
164. See Fullerton, supra note 4, at 44-45.
165. For a discussion of interstate bias see generally Goldman and Marks, Diversity
Jurisdiction and Local Bias: A Preliminary Empirical Inquiry, 9 J. Leg. Stud. 93 (1980).
See also 1 J. Moore, J. Lucas, H. Fink, D. Weckstein & J. Wicker, Moore's Federal
Practice, 0.71 [3.-2] at 701.32- .33 (2d. ed. 1986).
166. 13B C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 3601,
at 357 n.68 (1984). Discussing the role of diversity jurisdiction as it relates to out-of-state
bias, the American Law Institute stated:
[I]t is more appropriate, however, to consider the risk of prejudice not as a
separate problem but rather as one aspect of the possible shortcomings of state
justice. One such shortcoming is that the state venue provisions often localize
the place of trial in small constituencies. In these circumstances justice is likely
to be impeded by the provincialism of the local judge and jury, the tendency to
favor one of their own against an outsider, and the machinations of the local
'court house gang.'
13B C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, supra, § 3601, at 357 n.68 (1984) (quoting Ameri-
can Law Institute, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal
Courts, Official Draft, 106-07 (1969)).
167. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 US. 286, 297 (1980).
168. This is consistent with the results, though not the analysis, of conventional state
court minimum contacts analysis since the requirement of "contacts" actually should
give a great deal of weight to the defendant's interest in avoiding out-of-state litigation.
169. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 US. 186, 218 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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to the defendant's interest in avoiding jurisdiction. Burger King rein-
forces the Bauxite Court's statement that the defendant's jurisdictional
interest is a liberty interest.'17 Burger King and World- Wide Volkswagen,
however, indicate that the threshold is not described properly as either a
rational basis or fundamental rights/strict scrutiny analysis.' 7 ' The rela-
170. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 US. 462, 472 n.13 (1985) (citing Insur-
ance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 US. 694, 702-03 n.10
(1982)). Although the "minimum contacts" test is uniform, the nature of the liberty
interest it affords to a defendant is not. For example, if a Connecticut resident has a car
accident with a Rhode Island resident in Connecticut, the Rhode Island resident may not
be able to sue in a Rhode Island court, even if the Connecticut resident lives five miles
from the Rhode Island state line. But if a Los Angeles resident collides with a San Fran-
sisco resident anywhere in the country, any California court has jurisdiction over the
defendant, even though she lives several hundred miles from the home of the plaintiff. Of
course, state venue rules appear to indicate that the suit be brought in Los Angeles
County, where the defendant resides. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 395 (West 1973 & Supp.
1987). But see N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 503(a) (McKinney 1976) (allowing venue where
any party resides). Thus, the due process interest in jurisdiction is dependent on state
boundaries. This concept of contacts within a state boundary has no simple analogy in
ordinary due process analysis.
Even more troubling, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson sets forth a "sover-
eignty" or "power" aspect of jurisdiction that seems to draw federalism issues into the
analysis. See 444 US. 286, 294 (1980) (describing this interest as "interstate federal-
ism"). The Court, however, has backed away from this part of its jurisdictional analysis.
See Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 US. 694, 702
& n.10 (1982). The only area in which territorial concerns appear prevalent is jurisdic-
tion to tax-a category which includes International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 US.
310, 316 (1945) (dispute over liability for unemployment tax). For example, the Court in
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 US. 425 (1980), stated:
For a State to tax income generated in interstate commerce, the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes two requirements: a 'minimal
connection' between the interstate activities and the taxing State, and a rational
relationship between the income attributed to the State and the intrastate values
of the enterprise. The requisite 'nexus' is supplied if the corporation avails itself
of the 'substantial privilege of carrying on business' within the State ....
Id. at 436-37 (citations omitted).
171. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 US. 462, 474 (1985); World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 US. 286, 294 (1980).
In other areas of constitutional law involving liberty interests, such as free speech,
privacy and self-incrimination, the rights afforded individuals by due process restrictions
on state and federal powers are described more uniformly than they are with jurisdiction.
In other words, the freedom granted by the restrictions on federal power is generally the
same as the freedom granted by restrictions on state power. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378
US. 1, 3 (1964); but cf id. at 19-20 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for using
the fourteenth amendment's due process clause to incorporate, as against states, specifics
of fifth amendment's protection against self-incrimination).
In Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 US. 88 (1976), however, the Court suggested that
the scope of equal protection provided by the fifth amendment's due process clause might
not be the same as that afforded by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Id. at 100. The fifth amendment has no equal protection clause; the concept was
judicially determined to be included in the fifth amendment in Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 US.
497, 499 (1954). Thus, the difference may be due to the fact that the fifth amendment
aspect was not "incorporated" but simply was an adjunct of due process. Also, dis-
uniformity would result from the difference between the national interests that weigh
against the fifth amendment rights and the state interests that weigh against fourteenth
amendment rights. Id. Hampton even suggests that overriding federal interests may re-
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tive ease with which the Court found jurisdiction in Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine,'72 where the defendant had relatively little connection with
the forum, 73 in Calder v. Jones,'74 where the basis of jurisdiction was the
knowledge and intent of individuals to cause harm in California,' 75 and
in Burger King, where the focus of the Florida suit was a purely local
Michigan fast food franchise,' 76 clearly suggests that the defendant's in-
terest in avoiding litigation outside of his home state is less than
"fundamental."' ' 77
B. Threshold Level of Governmental Interest
The analogy of a defendant's liberty interest to a privacy interest
78
suggests that the appropriate threshold level of governmental interest in
jurisdiction be an intermediate level-the government should be required
to show an important, though not compelling, interest. 79 Because a
plaintiff has the option of suing a defendant in his home state, and be-
strict the individual right in a situation where the state could not. See Hampton, 426 U. S.
at 100. The proposed analysis is entirely consistent with Hampton. Indeed, by requiring
courts to focus on the governmental interests at stake, the proposed test brings the fed-
eral-state differences to the forefront of the analysis.
The reasons for the disparity in jurisdictional analysis may be historical. Pennoyer v.
Neff and International Shoe Co. v. Washington were decided before modern due process
analysis had been formulated fully. That is not a good reason, however, to relegate juris-
diction to its own due process niche. A careful analysis of jurisdiction permits at least
certain facets of it to coexist with other due process areas.
172. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
173. Defendant's only connection with the forum was the distribution of a relatively
small percentage of its magazines in New Hampshire. See 465 U.S. at 772. The plaintiff
sought damages primarily for the defamatory effects of the article outside New Hamp-
shire. See id. at 773.
174. 465 U.S. at 783 (1984).
175. Id. at 789-90.
176. 471 U.S. at 466-68.
177. Although a discussion of the theory of fundamental rights is beyond the scope of
this Article, I believe my conclusion is warranted particularly in light of the Court's
recent decision concerning the Georgia sodomy statute. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct.
2841 (1986). If fundamental rights do not encompass privately expressed sexual prefer-
ences, jurisdictional rights can hardly be viewed as "fundamental." Moreover, if one ex-
amines cases involving nationwide service, the liberty interest of a domestic defendant is
overcome in the face of a congressional mandate of authority. See Securities Investor
Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1315-16 (9th Cir. 1985) (indicating that due
process does not restrict Congress' ability to authorize nationwide service over domestic
defendants).
178. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
179. As discussed above, it is evident that jurisdiction is not considered a "fundamen-
tal" right requiring the highest level of scrutiny. See supra text accompanying note 177.
However, a "rational basis" test does not give sufficient protection to the liberty interest
at stake; it would allow almost any justification to be sufficient to overcome the defend-
ant's interest. Thus, some intermediate level of governmental interest which this author
calls "important" seems most appropriate. One can usefully compare this to the level of
scrutiny applied to commercial speech. In that area, the Court requires a "substantial"
governmental interest. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). Since overcoming jurisdictional interests does not
result directly in liability for the defendant, the protection of her interests do not seem to
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cause a complaint represents only allegations of wrongdoing, this thresh-
old should adequately protect the more or less fixed interests of privacy
and life management involved. One may ask why a threshold approach
rather than a pure balancing approach is being proposed. A simple an-
swer would be that it conforms loosely to what actually is being done.
There are, however, more compelling reasons for the choice. A pure bal-
ancing approach can undervalue the defendant's interests in a particular
case, or even overvalue it in another. The privacy-like interest ascribed
here to the defendant can be thought of as a floor on defendant's rights,
even if no "inconvenience" or other objective factors seem to exist in a
particular case. By forcing the government to establish a certain thresh-
old interest, the proposed test recognizes the subjective factors that sur-
round the so-called "right to be left alone." To this author, pure
balancing tests appear somewhat ad-hoc in administration. A threshold
test provides at least some degree of uniformity. 80
Considering only state court jurisdiction, the strongest state interest
lies in enforcing its own regulatory schemes-based either on statutory
or common law-against out-of-state transgressors.""' The Supreme
Court explicity has stated that this interest lacks relevance in jurisdic-
tional analysis. 82 It is difficult to fathom why the Court insists on di-
vorcing the choice of law question'83 from the jurisdiction question since
typical jurisdictional due process analysis already considers state's inter-
ests in general, of which the state's interest in applying its own laws is the
strongest. By separating the two analyses, the Court ignores the state's
primary reason for passing long-arm statutes.I 4
require more stringent scrutiny than the free speech interests found in cases like Central
Hudson.
180. Admittedly, however, a fair degree of subjectivity enters into the decision of what
constitutes a governmental interest important enough to meet the threshold.
181. As Professor Silberman noted regarding the Supreme Court's decision in Hanson
v. Denckla, "two different state courts, one in Delaware and one in Florida, adjudicated
an issue concerning the disposition of S400,000. Each court applied the law of its own
state" against the out-of-state transgressor, resulting in victory for the Florida plaintiffs in
Florida and defeat in Delaware since the Delaware court applied its own law to the out-
of-state Florida party. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 33, 83 (1978) (discussing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 US. 235 (1958)). The plaintiffs,
then, are more concerned about what law applies than where the suit is brought. Cf.
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 US. 770, 776 (1984) ("New Hampshire may rightly
employ its libel laws to discourage the deception of its citizens."); Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 US. 306, 313 (1950) (citing State's interest in its scheme
of regulating common trust funds to uphold jurisdiction over absent beneficiaries).
182. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 US. 186, 215-16 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 US.
235, 254 (1958).
183. The proposed test favors use of choice of law considerations in jurisdictional anal-
ysis but will not be satisfied by the mere assertion of a jurisdictional interest by a state.
Rather, in the jurisdictional analysis, courts must examine the legitimacy of the state's
interest in regulating the underlying conduct at issue.
184. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 US. 186, 224-26 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Professor Silberman has argued rather persuasively that a
state should be able to assert jurisdiction over a defendant whenever it may apply its own
law to the transaction. Silberman, supra note 181, at 79-90 (1978). Until the Supreme
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Use of choice of law analysis in jurisdictional analysis, however, would
involve certain complications. Presently there are few constitutional lim-
itations on a state's choice of which law to apply. 85 The proposed con-
stitutional test for jurisdiction, however, examines the legitimacy of the
state's choice of its own law at an early stage. In some cases, this test will
require a court to make choice of law decisions that were previously
avoidable, as when the law in all relevant states is the same. In such
cases, courts should examine whether the forum state could assert its
own law under the present constitutional standards.1 16 This decreases the
value of that interest due to the minimal review of such decisions. In
addition, if choice of law will not affect the rule of decision in the under-
lying case, its weight in the jurisdictional analysis is lessened. In a com-
plex choice of law problem, the weight ascribed to the state's choice of
law interest also should be reduced correspondingly.
The Burger King decision provides some hope that the Court will
move towards weighing choice of law interests in the future. The Court
specifically rejected the idea that Hanson v. Denckla made choice of law
considerations irrelevant to jurisdictional analysis:
The Court in Hanson and subsequent cases has emphasized that
choice-of-law analysis-which focuses on all elements of a transaction,
and not simply on the defendant's conduct-is distinct from mini-
mum-contacts jurisdictional analysis-which focuses at the threshold
solely on the defendant's purposeful connection to the forum. Nothing
in our cases, however, suggests that a choice-of-law provision should be
ignored in considering whether a defendant has 'purposefully invoked
the benefits and protections of a State's laws' for jurisdictional
purposes. '8 7
It is not a great leap from this statement, concurred in by six of the nine
justices, to the proposition that a state's interest in applying its own law
is generally a relevant jurisdictional interest. 8 Regardless, under the
Court makes a serious effort to regulate choice of law under the fourteenth amendment, I
prefer simply to accord it weight as one of the state's interests balanced against the de-
fendant's liberty interest.
185. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 US. 302, 312-13 (1981) (state's choice of law
must not be "arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair"); see generally Weinberg, Choice of
Law and Minimal Scrutiny, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 440 (1982). In the same term as Burger
King, the Court struck down a state's use of its own law in Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822 (1985) (state's application of its law to every claim was "arbi-
trary and unfair"). Perhaps the Shutts decision signals more diligent supervision by the
Court in this area. Shutts, however, apparently approved of the minimal scrutiny princi-
pIe of Allstate. See 472 U.S. at 818-19.
186. This analysis will not always be easy. In some cases, more than one state's law
can apply. In such cases, courts should focus on whether the forum state could apply its
law to this particular defendant, leaving other choice of law problems for a different
analysis.
187. 471 U.S. 462, 481-82 (1985) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
188. For evidence of further movement by courts towards considering choice of law
interests, see Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 35, 53, 702 P.2d 543,
554, 216 Cal. Rptr. 385, 395 (1985) (discussing California's interest in ensuring that for-
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proposed test, choice of law is only one of the governmental interests
present in state court cases. 89 Although it is a very important factor, its
recognition is not decisive in meeting the threshold.
Protecting state residents by affording them a convenient forum in
which to litigate constitutes the primary remaining state interest." °
Presently, courts recognize this interest only after sufficient "contacts"
have been established, 9 ' and, admittedly, this interest is relatively small.
Related to this interest is one of preventing out-of-state actors from com-
mitting unlawful acts, as defined by any state or federal law, within the
state. Where the plaintiff is a state resident, both interests are advanced.
Even when the plaintiff is not a state resident, a convenient forum pro-
tects local witnesses and also provides a forum less biased against the
defendant. Unless coupled with an interest in applying the state's own
law, however, providing a generally convenient forum seldom will prove
to be a substantial interest.
192
C. Other Factors
Under the proposed test, once the threshold is surmounted, a balanc-
ing test is applied. Courts should examine a number of factors. Incon-
venience to the defendant and to his witnesses should be weighed. 93
eign manufacturers comply with the state's safety standards), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 1026
(1987). Though it reversed the lower court, the Supreme Court discussed the possible
interests of California, concluding that they were minimal. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.
Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1034 (1987); cf. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 US. at
776 (describing states' interest as a "surrogate" for other jurisdictional factors).
189. Choice of law is not always the motivating force behind a plaintiff's choice of
forum. In the first place, many states apply the same set of legal principles to a variety of
cases. Moreover, other concerns are often more compelling. For example, in World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, the plaintiff's motive in selecting the forum may
have been the reputation of the local court to award large verdicts.
190. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 US. 286, 292 (1980);
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 US. 220, 223 (1957).
191. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 US. 462, 481-82 (1985).
192. Some indication of this is found in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 339 US. 306 (1950). In Mullane, the Supreme Court determined, among other
things, that the New York courts had jurisdiction over out-of-state trust beneficiaries. In
doing so, the Court gave some weight to the interest of New York in settling the accounts
of common trust funds located in New York-thus protecting the interests of the local
institutions including the interest in providing a convenient forum in which to litigate. Id.
at 313. Providing a local forum in which to litigate, however, also was an integral part of
the legislative scheme which sought to promote New York institutions as trustees of com-
mon trust funds. Id. at 311-13. Thus, the local forum interests were combined with an
interest in the state in upholding its legislative scheme.
193. Arguably, witness inconvenience comprises a greater factor. Most defendants are
covered by insurance, which lessens their inconvenience costs. Defendants tend to be
deposed where they live or are employed, see, e.g., Sugarhill Records Ltd. v. Motown
Record Corp., 105 F.R.D. 166, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (citing this as the general rule,
though declining to follow it); Pinkham v. Paul, 91 F.R.D. 613, 615 (D. Me. 1981) (fol-
lowing this rule and extending it to include a defendant asserting a compulsory counter-
claim as well as a party joined in a compulsory counterclaim, since both should be
considered to be in the same position as ordinary defendants); Buryan v. Max Factor &
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Because the degree of inconvenience varies widely from case to case, 194
the balancing portion of the test becomes a more appropriate place to
consider it than at the threshold level. The plaintiff's convenience fac-
tors also should comprise an element of the balancing test,g19 especially if
the alternative forum is distant from the one plaintiff has chosen.
96
Although not relevant to federal cases, the interstate interests cited in
Burger King and World-Wide Volkswagen also should be weighed.' 97
Application of the threshold-plus-balancing test using only presently
accepted governmental interests, which exclude choice of law, yields re-
sults strikingly similar to those reached under minimum contacts analy-
sis, because the contacts analysis-and the purposeful availment segment
of this analysis in particular-incorporates the major state interests. Spe-
cifically, a defendant that "purposefully avails" itself of the forum state
has invoked the state's interest in deterring unlawful acts by such out-of-
state residents. Since, however, the major state interests are seen from
the perspective of their impact on the defendant's interests, in a close
case the remaining state interests often become relatively small, and the
cases result in more defendant-oriented decisions like those following in
the wake of Shaffer and World-Wide Volkswagen. 9 s If choice of law
considerations were not excluded, then the results in some cases would
Co., 41 F.R.D. 330, 331-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (applying this rule since requiring defend-
ants to leave their place of residence or employment "would necessarily be oppressive and
annoying" and would seriously hamper their ability to operate their businesses); Kurt M.
Jachmann Co. v. Hartley, Cooper & Co., 16 F.R.D. 565, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (citing the
rule as "[t]he proper place for taking the oral deposition of indivudual defendants is their
residence, or of corporate defendants, their principal place of business"), and will only be
inconvenienced greatly if the case goes to trial. Even then, their expenses may be paid
for. The insurance company often undertakes to pay the expenses, or the court may
order it to do so. See, e.g., Philadelphia National Bank v. Dow Chemical Co., 106 F.R.D.
342, 345 (E.D. Pa. 1984). In contrast, reimbursement for witness expenses under the
federal statute is meager. See 28 U.S.C. § 1821 (1982) (generally gives thirty dollars per
day and some travel expenses).
194. Determining witness inconvenience requires courts to analyze the importance of
the witness, the ability of the parties to use the witness' deposition at trial, the willingness
of the witness to appear, the ability of the court to subpoena the witness, the actual
burden on the witness to appear, and so forth.
195. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985) (citing
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)); Keeton v. Hus-
tler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770, 780 (1984).
196. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 US. 220, 223 (1957) (discussing the
value of plaintiff's home forum in the context of forum non conveniens); Koster v. Lum-
berman's Mutual Ins. Co., 330 US. 518, 524 (1947) (same).
197. These include " 'the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most effi-
cient resolution of controversies', and the 'shared interest of the several States in further-
ing fundamental substantive social policies.'" Burger King, 471 US. at 477 (quoting
World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 US. at 292). In a federal question case, the interstate judi-
cial system has little contact with the matter because such cases usually are brought in
federal court. The social policies being furthered are those federally-, not state-, man-
dated and again are tried primarily in federal court.
198. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1031-33 (1987);
Heliocopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 US. 408, 415-16 (1984); Kulko
v. Superior Court, 436 US. 84, 94 (1978).
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have been different. 99
As discussed above, the proposed test assumes that the government
must demonstrate an important interest in asserting jurisdiction over the
defendant. Because it forces early and more frequent decisions about
choice of law, this analysis also will force the courts to reflect on the
appropriate limits on a state's choice of its own law. 2"
V. APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED TEST IN FEDERAL CASES
A. Federal Question Cases
Although the proposed analysis would have some effect on jurisdiction
in state courts, it would effectuate its most far-reaching changes in fed-
eral cases. This section will examine the proposed test in federal ques-
tions cases.
Roughly speaking, these cases can be divided into two categories for
the purpose of jurisdictional analysis: federal questions where a special
long-arm statute (ordinarily providing for nationwide service of process)
exists and federal questions where no such special statute exists. The first
category-nationwide service-does not raise the preliminary statutory
questions that were discussed in Part II above.201 The language of Rule
4(e) allowing service "under the circumstances . . . prescribed by the
[federal] statute . . . " governs these cases. 202
As a rule, in cases where the statute provides for nationwide service,
the courts do not spend much time on a due process discussion. This
appears to result from an application of a "minimum contacts" analysis
to such cases. Once the "contacts" portion of the test is satisfied, juris-
diction is said to exist.2 °3 In nationwide service cases, the forum against
199. For example, in Shaffer, the state of Delaware had a manifest interest in regulat-
ing the corporate activities of officials of Delaware corporations. If such considerations
were taken into account, Delaware would have had jurisdiction over the defendants. The
Court implicitly acknowledged this interest but said that Delaware had to assert it affirm-
atively, which it later did. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 US. 186, 214-15 (1977); see 6 Del.
Code Ann. tit. 10, § 3114 (Supp. 1986); see also Armstrong v. Pomerance, 423 A.2d 174,
179 (Del. 1980) (upholding the Delaware statute).
Another possible difference resulting from the balancing of state interests, including
choice of law, would arise in large states. At present, there is no due process impediment
to dragging a defendant a large distance across a state like California, Texas or Alaska,
which may prove far more inconvenient than dragging a defendant a short distance
across state lines. If the defendant's due process right is not linked to being dragged out
of state, but simply related to being forced to litigate in an unanticipated, faraway forum,
in theory, one's due process rights could be violated by a purely intrastate suit. The
state's interests in apportioning rights between its own citizens and in organizing its own
judicial system, however, should outweigh the individual's interest in all but the rarest of
cases.
200. The Supreme Court has placed minimal constitutional limits on choice of law
thus far. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 48-120 and accompanying text.
202. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4.
203. For example, once the Court in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz found sufficient
contacts, it disposed of defendant's inconvenience argument by suggesting that a defend-
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which contacts are measured is usually the United States. 0" Thus, virtu-
ally any domestic defendant will have minimum contacts with the coun-
try as a whole. The cases discussing due process in this context,
therefore, often involve alien defendants, and courts measure the alien's
contacts with the country as a whole.20 5 Although Burger King and
Asahi Metal Industrial Co. v. Superior Court"2 6 indicate that, even where
contacts exist, courts should address fairness considerations, 20 7 they sel-
dom do so, especially in nationwide service cases.208 Indeed, at least one
case and one commentator have suggested that, in a nationwide service
case, once contacts with the United States are found, no further analysis
ant who was severely inconvenienced by plaintiff's choice of forum could ask for a
change of venue. 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985). Arguably, once it is clear that defendant is
subject to jurisdiction in any federal court the rest is just a matter of venue. See FTC v.
Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251, 257 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981) (once defendant has
minimum contacts with the United States, Congress has discretion over where the case
should be litigated). Thus, it appears that the analysis described here "constitutionalizes
venue." See Barrett, Venue and Service of Process in the Federal Courts-Suggestionsfor
Reform, 7 Vand. L. Rev. 608, 628-30 (1954) (suggesting nationwide service along with
liberalized venue for all federal cases).
This argument is not without force, but there is no reason to assume that the Constitu-
tion places no restriction on Congress' venue choices. Whether one calls it "venue" or
"jurisdiction," a defendant still has a due process liberty interest at stake. See supra note
170 and accompanying text. In diversity cases, where fourteenth amendment jurispru-
dence currently is used to safeguard due process, the choice of forum also determines
choice of law, including the forum state's choice of law rules. See Van Dusen v. Barrack,
376 U.S. 612, 638-39 (1964) (transfer of venue does not affect choice of law); Klaxon Co.
v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
The same situation exists in federal question cases that include pendent claims, ancil-
lary claims, or both, which the court will also decide using state law. See 19 C. Wright,
A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4515, at 276 & n. 11 (1982).
Thus, imparting venue with a constitutional dimension may impact profoundly on the
rule of decision used in the underlying case. Moreover, as Professor Fullerton has
pointed out, improper venue is not a ground for collateral attack, nor is transfer available
as a matter of right. Therefore, constitutional restriction is needed. Fullerton, supra note
4, at 35-38; see also Clermont, supra note 26, at 430-32, 434-37.
204. See, e.g., Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1315-16
(9th Cir. 1985) ("[w]here a federal statute ... confers nationwide service of process, 'the
question becomes whether the party has sufficient contacts with the United States' ")
(quoting Nelson v. Quimby Island Reclamation Dist. Facilities Corp., 491 F. Supp. 1364,
1378 (N.D. Cal. 1980)); FTC v. Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251, 256 (5th Cir. Unit A
July 1981); Green, supra note 4, at 469-70 (when minimum contacts exist with the rele-
vant sovereign, due process no longer protects a defendant from distant litigation because
the location of permissible venue is a matter of sovereign prerogative).
205. See supra note 102 and accompanying text; for a general discussion, see supra
notes 75-102 and accompanying text.
206. 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987).
207. See Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1033-34 (1987)
(although the Court had already found that defendant had insufficient contacts, it ana-
lyzed the contacts to determine reasonableness); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471
US. 462, 476-78 (1985) (even though contacts are established, Court looks at other fac-
tors to determine if jurisdiction would be unfair regardless of the contacts).
208. See, e.g., FTC v. Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251, 256-57 (5th Cir. Unit A July
1981); Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 1979); Clement v. Pehar, 575
F. Supp. 436, 438-39 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
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is necessary.20 9 This provides no protection for domestic defendants,
however, and possibly inadequate protection for aliens.
Moreover, of the other considerations set out in World-Wide Volk-
swagen and Burger King-"the 'forum State's interest in adjudicating the
dispute,' 'the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective re-
lief,' 'the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most effi-
cient resolution of controversies,' and the 'shared interest of the several
States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies' "2 1 0 -only
one is not tied to a state-based jurisdictional system. Thus, these consid-
erations serve little purpose in a nationwide service case (or in any other
federal case for that matter). But if defendant has a real due process
interest, the mere assertion of power by Congress should not end the
discussion. At the very least, a court should determine whether there is
good reason to force the defendant to come to this particular district
court to litigate.
This is the point of the proposed analysis. Rather than delegating the
constitutional task to a judge's sense of fairness, 211 the test attempts to
impose some order and consistency on the decisions. After all, the de-
fendant's liberty interest is one partly tied to a location, namely the
home. Assuming that the right to be left alone reaches, at most, to the
borders of the home state,2 12 it is not rational to assume that a defendant
reasonably expects to be sued in any federal court on a federal claim.
Many defendants will not make the distinction between conduct that vio-
lates a federal law and that which violates state law; some will violate
both. Moreover, most people do not understand the notions of federalism
and a unified federal court system. They see the country in terms of state
boundaries. Some historical logic exists, therefore, to using state bounda-
ries as a starting point for a defendant's expectations, even in a federal
question case.2 13
Thus, the proposed analysis forces the court to look for an important
interest in forcing defendant into that particular district, but the analysis
of governmental interests occurs at the threshold level, where it can af-
fect the results, instead of being considered only after the court finds suf-
209. See Stafford v. Briggs, 444 US. 527, 553-54 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting); see
also Abrams, supra note 4, at 8 (quoting Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion in Stafford v.
Briggs).
210. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 US. 462, 477 (1985) (quoting World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 US. 286, 292 (1980)).
211. Professor Fullerton uses fairness as a primary factor in her balancing test for
analyzing the legitimacy of nationwide service. Fullerton, supra note 4, at 38-41, 85. She
states that governmental interests have a place in the analysis. Id. at 56-60, 85. See also
Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191, 203-05 (E.D. Pa. 1974)
(court applies fairness test to determine appropriateness of nationwide service of process).
The threshold-plus-balancing test, however, gives more precise protection to the pre-
sumed privacy-like interest of the defendant, while giving appropriate weight to other
factors.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 164-67.
213. See Fullerton, supra note 4, at 44-45.
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ficient contacts. This allows what might be a tenuous case for
jurisdiction in state court terms to become a constitutionally permissible
one.
Federal question cases, in contrast with diversity cases, theoretically
involve no choice of law issue.214 The fact that nationwide service is part
of a larger regulatory scheme, however, creates a governmental interest.
For example, with securities regulation, Congress intended to provide a
broad remedial statute.21 5 By making it easier for private litigants to sue,
Congress enhanced the deterrent effect of the law and the rights of disclo-
sure set out in the securities laws. The federal interest, however, does not
always necessarily override defendant's interests. Courts still must con-
sider the countervailing individual interests of reasonable control over
the effects of one's conduct so that unexpected litigation consequences,
such as a very inconvenient forum, do not result. When faced with the
more substantial federal interest in the statutory scheme, however, the
individual's interest ordinarily will lose.
Things grow a bit more complicated when dealing with federal ques-
tion cases where no nationwide service statute exists. In those cases,
state long-arm statutes provide the statutory basis for jurisdiction, and,
as noted above, specific statutory limits must be respected.21 6 Once those
limits have been complied with, however, the analysis proceeds to the
constitutional test, which incorporates the same concepts for nationwide
service expressed above. On the governmental interest side, however,
one major piece will be missing: jurisdiction no longer forms a part of the
larger statutory scheme. Once the jurisdictional interest is removed, the
remaining federal interests shrink in importance, though they never
disappear.217
Individual statutory schemes, however, may contain some evidence of
the need for a broader jurisdictional standard, even though they contain
no jurisdictional section. For example, in the civil rights statutes, Con-
gress clearly intended that the statutory scheme provide a relatively ac-
cessible remedy,2 18 suggesting that courts allow jurisdiction where it
214. A choice of law issue could arise in a federal question case involving a foreign
defendant.
215. See Carpenter v. Hall, 352 F. Supp. 806, 809-10 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (noting congres-
sional purpose of providing a convenient forum through the nationwide service and venue
provisions of the 1933 and 1934 securities acts); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-
32 (1964) (discussing § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, governing proxies,
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982)); Kane v. Central Am. Mining & Oil, Inc., 235 F.
Supp. 559, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (noting congressional purpose of providing an accessible
forum).
216. See supra notes 57, 118 and accompanying text.
217. Because the interest must relate to having the litigation brought in a particular
federal court, rather than in federal court in general, the overall statutory scheme auto-
matically does not provide a jurisdictional interest in such cases.
218. In McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 US. 668 (1963), the Court stated that:
[t]he purposes [of Section 1983] were severalfold-to override certain kinds of
state laws, to provide a remedy where state law was inadequate, to provide a
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would otherwise fail.2 19 Courts must exercise caution in adopting such a
lenient attitude toward jurisdiction, however, because if Congress had
considered the interest in ease of litigation very large, it probably would
have provided for nationwide service in the statute.
In addition, federal jurisdictional interests often relate to substantive
regulatory interests.22° Those substantive regulatory interests bearing on
the jurisdictional question should be considered to determine if that par-
ticular federal court, not federal courts in general, have jurisdiction.
The federal venue statutes221 express a general interest in having the
litigation brought in particular districts. Venue alone, however, does not
translate into a strong federal interest in asserting jurisdiction. Absent
some strong showing of a connection between federal venue under Sec-
tion 139 1,222 the general venue statute, and a federal statutory scheme,
this interest is small. A number of federal statutes contain specific venue
provisions providing that venue is proper in almost every instance, but
many of these statutes do not contain separate service of process provi-
sions.223 Under the proposed test, the federal interest in jurisdiction ex-
pressed by these special venue statutes carries greater weight when the
regulatory scheme does not contain a provision for nationwide service.
By incorporating state long-arm statutes through Rule 4 when the fed-
eral statute does not provide for jurisdiction, Congress arguably has in-
cluded as federal interests the concerns of the state in which the district
court sits, as well as the more general concerns of the substantive statute
at issue. Thus, when an action constituting a violation of the federal
statute takes place in the district, an important interest in adjudicating
the suit there exists.
Assuming that the governmental interest has reached the intermediate
threshold, the court then can consider whatever interests defendant has,
such as convenience. The government's interests would then be balanced
against the totality of defendant's interests. On balance, the results using
the modified important-governmental-interest-plus-balancing test should
federal remedy where the state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not
available in practice, and to provide a remedy in the federal courts supplemen-
tary to any remedy any State might have.
Id. at 671-72 (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 US. 167, 174 (1961)); see also United States
v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 197-98 (3d Cir. 1980).
219. A state court analogy can be found in Calder v. Jones, 465 US. 783 (1984), where
the Court, citing Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, stated that the plaintiff's contacts with the
forum, though not sufficient or even necessary, could justify a finding of jurisdiction when
it might otherwise be improper. IaM at 788 (citing Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 US.
770, 780-81 (1984)).
220. See supra text accompanying notes 214-16.
221. 28 US.C. §§ 1391-1407 (1982).
222. 28 US.C. § 1392 (1982).
223. See 15 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure,
§ 3825, at 252 (1986). Most federal statutes that provide for venue allow it where the
defendant resides or where some act constituting a violation of the statute takes place. See
id. Under the test set out here, there should be no problem upholding jurisdiction in
those districts.
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at least resemble those presently achieved.224
B. Diversity Cases
At first glance, Justice Powell's Bauxite opinion seems to imply that
federal interests225 play a very small role in diversity cases. To some
degree this is true; the main purpose of diversity jurisdiction is to provide
a neutral forum for an out-of-state litigant in an otherwise ordinary state
court case.226
Simply because a plaintiff otherwise would be forced to bring suit in
the defendant's home state does not give weight to arguments that a fed-
eral court should assert jurisdiction in a diversity case where a state
could not. Though such jurisdiction would prevent bias to the plain-
tiff,2 27 local bias against the plaintiff is overcome adequately by the avail-
ability of federal court jurisdiction in the defendant's home state. Thus,
the federal government's interest is very tenuous, if it exists at all. For
the federal government to have a significant jurisdictional interest in the
location of a trial, diversity jurisdiction must be viewed as intending to
protect an out-of-state defendant from local state bias while simultane-
ously giving the plaintiff the right to litigate in his or her home state.
Moreover, the right being litigated is a creation of state, not federal,
law. A federal court, out of simple comity concerns, appropriately can
defer to the local state court's determination of the importance of pro-
tecting those rights. This suggests that whatever interests suffice for a
224. If defendant is an alien, the proposed test could support the results achieved by
the "aggregate contacts" tests-at least in federal question cases. The greatest liberty
deprivation for an alien is to litigate in an American court. Further, the great leeway
traditionally afforded the federal government in regulating the conduct of aliens doing
business with Americans, see Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78-80 (1976); Leon Moon
Sing v. United States, 158 US. 538, 547 (1895); cf Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 US.
88, 99-101 (1976) (plenary federal power over immigration and naturalization), would
provide a fairly significant interest, as long as the choice of districts is not so irrational as
to deprive the defendant of a reasonable opportunity to defend itself.
The decision to adopt a fifth amendment standard, however, does not mean that the
"aggregate contacts" test is appropriate in all cases. The most glaring problem with this
analysis is that its adoption via Rule 4 would mean that Congress adopted nationwide
service for all federal claims except where the state long-arm statute falls short of due
process limits. Although the 1963 amendments to Rule 4 were intended to broaden the
jurisdictional reach of federal district courts, it is doubtful that Congress intended such a
broad change.
225. Parts B and C largely will discuss the federal interests that fall within the pro-
posed test. It is assumed that the defendant's basic interests remain the same throughout.
See supra notes 163-77 and accompanying text. Naturally, any special problems would
be handled on a case-by-case basis through the balancing portion of the test, making
generalizations difficult.
226. 13B C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3601, at
355-56 (1984). Wright, Miller & Cooper believe, however, that in today's mobile society,
this concern no longer retains significance. Id. at 356-57.
227. One assumes that bias against out-of-state plaintiffs is also a rationale for diversity
jurisdiction because otherwise there is little reason to afford diversity jurisdiction when
the plaintiff is the out-of-state party.
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
state court to subject a defendant to its jurisdiction should also suffice to
bring that defendant into federal court in that state.
228
In some diversity cases, courts also should take uniquely federal inter-
ests into account. For example, in Bauxite, the Court upheld a finding of
juridiction as a Rule 37229 sanction for failure to abide by discovery or-
ders concerning jurisdiction.23 A simple fourteenth amendment "mini-
mum contacts" analysis ignores the federal court's interest in upholding
its procedures.23 In Bauxite, Justice Powell's concurrence argued that at
least a prima facie case of minimum contacts must be made before a Rule
37 sanction can be invoked.232 Courts should ask whether the federal
government's interests in upholding its procedures and providing plain-
tiffs with an opportunity to prove their case outweigh the defendant's
liberty/due process interests.233 The proposed analysis considers federal
interests while preserving the state-based interests seemingly expressed in
Rule 4(e).
C. Diversity Cases With Federal Claims-Burger King Revisited
At trial, the diversity claim in Burger King was joined with a federal
question claim. On appeal, defendants contested personal jurisdiction
only for the state contract claim, 21 even though the trademark claim
also was governed by Rule 4(e). The plaintiff logically could have argued
that jurisdiction should be challenged for all related claims or for none of
them because the constitutional standards are the same.2 35 The Supreme
Court, however, treated the case as a simple diversity matter, making
only a passing reference in a footnote to the fact that the original claim
228. Congress could decide that the federal interest is less than the state interest and
amend Rule 4 to make it harder to bring the out-of-state litigant into federal court than
into the state court.
229. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37.
230. Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 US. 694,
709 (1982).
231. See id. The Court's approach in Bauxite, however, contains problems. One
might question how a court reasonably can expect compliance with its orders when juris-
diction over the party has yet to be established. See Bauxite, 456 US. at 714-16 (Powell,
J., concurring in judgment) (noting that there is nothing in Rule 37 that grants jurisdic-
tion). Moreover, one might well ask whether a state court could make a similar finding
using its own discovery rules. Some of these problems are dealt with by the proposed
government interests test for jurisdiction.
232. Id. at 715-16 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment).
233. But see id. at 714-15 (Powell, J., concurring) (Rule 37 is not a basis for asserting
personal jurisdiction).
234. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 US. 462, 469-70 & n.ll (1985).
235. Compare Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 US. 770, 774-76 (1984) (using four-
teenth amendment due process standards in a diversity case) and DeMelo v. Toche
Marine, Inc., 711 F.2d 1260, 1265 (5th Cir. 1983) (same) with Max Daetwyler Corp. v. R.
Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 296 (3d Cir.) (fourteenth amendment due process standards restrict
federal court jurisdiction in nondiversity cases), cert denied, 474 US. 980 (1985) and
Johnson Creative Arts, Inc. v. Wool Masters, Inc., 743 F.2d 947, 950 (1st Cir. 1984)
(denying that fourteenth amendment standards apply in federal question cases).
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had involved a trademark claim, a matter of federal law, as well.2 36
Treating a diversity case which also involves a federal claim as a sim-
ple diversity action ignores important federal interests. The interest in
judicial economy alone is insufficient to overcome a due process interest,
except where inconvenience to the defendant is virtually non-existent.
Control of the fact-finding process in the federal part of the action, how-
ever, constitutes a more potent interest. If the case is split into a state and
a federal action, the state case might go to trial first. In that event, a
federal court could be forced to give issue-preclusive effect to the findings
of the state court.2 37 Moreover, the federal claim might be subject to
claim preclusion because it could have been brought in the state ac-
tion.23' Thus, whatever interests allowed the case to be brought in the
federal court would be lost. Litigation of the second case in state court
would subjugate to the due process interest the goal of uniform federal
adjudication of federal statutes.
Burger King serves as a prime example. Jurisdiction over the defend-
ants under the federal trademark statute was not questioned by either
defendant.239 Curiously, the plaintiff did not argue that the existence of
jurisdiction for purposes of the Lanham Act claim conferred jurisdiction
over the defendants for all related claims. 240
The federal interest in Burger King is indirect. In Burger King, ifjuris-
236. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 US. 462, 469-70 n.11 (1985).
237. See, e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 US. 90, 95 (1980) (recognizing that federal
courts generally give preclusive effect to issues litigated in prior state proceeding, Court
held that collateral estoppel applies when § 1983 plaintiffs attempt to relitigate in federal
court issues decided against them in state court proceedings); see also 28 US.C. § 1738
(1982) (ensuring full faith and credit given to state court proceedings).
238. See, e.g., Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 US. 75, 83-85
(1984) (claim under 42 US.C. § 1983 can be precluded by prior state case; Court re-
manded for determination of Ohio law of preclusion); Derish v. San Mateo-Burlingame
Bd. of Realtors, 724 F.2d 1347, 1352 (9th Cir. 1983) (claim under federal antitrust laws
precluded by prior case brought under state antitrust law); Nash County Bd. of Educ. v.
Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484, 486-92 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 US. 878 (1981) (same).
The Supreme Court has held that the claim preclusive effect of a prior state judgment is
to be determined by looking to the preclusion law of the judgment-rendering state. See
Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380 (1985);
Migra, 465 US. at 85. As the Court suggested in Marrese, many states deny claim
preclusive effect when the first court would not have had subject matter jurisdiction over
the claim that is being asserted in the second suit. Marrese, 470 U.S. at 383 (noting that
the Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 25(1), 26(l)(c) supports this view). In those
instances, the prior state judgment may not have claim preclusive effect on a later claim
that is within the exclusive subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. See id.
239. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. Because the Lanham Act does not
contain a nationwide service provision, see 15 US.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982 & Supp. IV
1987), Rule 4(e) applies, incorporating the state's-in this case Florida's-long-arm
statute.
240. Burger King's brief to the Court mentioned the possibility but did not develop the
point. Brief for Appellant at 47-48. The idea resembles pendent subject matter jurisdic-
tion, where the courts hear claims related to a federal claim even when federal subject
matter jurisdiction would not exist for the related claim alone. See United Mine Workers
v. Gibbs, 383 US. 715, 725-29 (1966).
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diction did not exist for the contract claim in Florida, then the plaintiffs
would have had to litigate in Michigan. At that point, Burger King either
would have had two cases in two jurisdictions-a contract claim in
Michigan and a trademark claim in Florida-or it would have been
forced to bring its trademark claim in a Michigan federal court. If it
chose the former, the Michigan judgment could preclude the Florida ac-
tion.24" ' If it chose, or was forced into, the latter option, it would lose the
ability to litigate the trademark claim in Florida. As a result, the federal
policy behind the ability to litigate in Florida would be thwarted.
Though this may seem like a relatively insignificant interest, it is the
same interest that allows the trademark claim to be brought in Florida in
the first place.2 42 Thus, it would have been sufficient to satisfy the gov-
ernment's initial burden under the proposed test.
Even if the liberty interest is overcome and the threshold test is met for
one claim, the court should not automatically conclude that the test has
been met for all claims. Arguably, if a given state or district is not incon-
venient for the litigation of one claim, it cannot be inconvenient for an-
other claim. Such an argument, however, is insufficient to block a due
process challenge to jurisdiction over the second claim since jurisdiction
is not viewed purely as a matter of convenience. For example, in at least
one case in New York state court, plaintiff's argument that defendant's
amenability to process in an unrelated case in New York federal court
made him subject to suit in New York state court 43 was dismissed by the
court on statutory grounds.' 4 Constitutional grounds, however, man-
date the same decision. To conclude otherwise would take even the pro-
posed interest analysis too far.
The idea that a defendant can be subject to jurisdiction for only a nar-
row purpose is not new. It serves as the basis for the distinction between
241. Because the federal claim could have been litigated in Michigan, claim preclusion
probably would bar the Florida action if the Michigan case went to trial first. However,
the Florida action might not preclude the Michigan action because of the inability of the
federal court in Florida to obtain jurisdiction over Rudzewicz on the contract claim. See
Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 US. 373, 383 (1985).
242. It is hard to understand why Rudzewicz and MacShara only appealed personal
jurisdiction as to the contract claim. Surely the trademark claim, which was a product of
the franchise agreement, has as much, or as little, connection with Florida as the contract
claim. Given that Rule 4 would govern both claims, one would have expected a court to
apply the same standard-minimum contacts with Florida-to both claims. Under this
Article's proposed analysis, the chances of having jurisdiction over a federal claim and
not over a related state claim would be increased, because different interests would be
considered.
In general, where the "pendent" claim stems from diversity, and the state claim is
brought in federal court, the problem of a state court thwarting federal resolution of
federal questions is not present. Unless it is impossible to find a federal forum where both
can be tried (which is extremely unlikely), the federal claim no doubt would be trans-
ferred pursuant to 28 U S.C. § 1404(a) and consolidated with the diversity claim.
243. Rockwood Nat'l Corp. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 100 Misc. 2d 688, 690-
91, 420 N.Y.S. 2d 49, 51-52 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Westchester County 1976), aff'd on other
grounds, 63 A.D.2d 978, 406 N.Y.S.2d 106 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 1978).
244. Id.
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specific and general jurisdiction.245 Permitting jurisdiction over unre-
lated claims would destroy this distinction. Proper assertion of personal
jurisdiction over a party does not constitute waiver of the liberty interest.
Although proper assertion of personal jurisdiction may indicate a lack of
personal inconvenience in defending claims in the forum, lack of personal
inconvenience is not the only limitation on jurisdiction. The defendant's
liberty interest includes the ability to have witnesses testify without in-
convenience.246 In addition, where the state's interest in applying its own
law barely falls within constitutional bounds, courts should afford the
liberty interest greater weight. Thus, the state interest should be con-
strued narrowly so that the liberty interest is overcome only for the nar-
row purpose of the claim brought and related claims, and not for
unrelated claims.2 47
An alternative solution, supported by ample precedent, entails the use
of pendent personal jurisdiction.248 In Burger King, for example,
although the Court's diversity jurisdiction technically supported the
245. In Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984), the
Court, in defining specific jurisdiction, stated "[it] has been said that when a State exer-
cises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising out of or related to the de-
fendant's contacts with the forum, the State is exercising 'specific jurisdiction' over the
defendant". Id. at 414 n.8.
The Court defined general jurisdiction over a defendant as "a State exercis[ing] per-
sonal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit not arising out of or related to the defendant's
contacts with the forum." Id. at 414 n.9.
246. The Supreme Court noted that this could be a factor in Burger King v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462, 483 & n.27 (1985), but found it not to be factually supported in that case.
See also supra note 193 and accompanying text.
247. An analogous problem existed in Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978). In
that case, a California resident sued her ex-husband, a New York resident, in California
state court to obtain custody of their children (previously awarded to the father) and
child support. See id. at 88. The children were residing with the mother in California at
the time, and neither the father nor the Court questioned the authority of the California
courts to rule on the custody dispute. See id. The Court held, however, that asserting
jurisdiction over the father to decide the issue of child support violated due process. Id.
at 96-98. Thus, a significant facet of the child support problem-which parent should
have custody-would be decided in California, while a New York state court would de-
termine how much should be paid for support. The case does not raise the preclusion
problem inherent in pendent jurisdiction cases. If the father conceded that California had
a sufficient interest to consider the custody dispute, why was it insufficient to confer a
constitutionally permissible level of interest to decide the support issue? The real issue
being determined was whether California should be permitted to apply its own law to the
support question. Under the author's proposal, that would normally be a factor. Under
the Kulko facts, one could resolve the jurisdictional issue in favor of the mother, even
assuming New York law applied, because of the interest conferred by the custody battle.
At some later date, however, the court would have to face squarely the choice of law
issue.
248. See, e.g., Ferguson, Pendent Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 11 Vill. L.
Rev. 56 (1965); Mills, Pendent Jurisdiction and Extraterritorial Service Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 423, 423-25 (1970); Note, Removing the Cloak of
Personal Jurisdiction From Choice of Law Analysis: Pendent Jurisdiction and Nationwide
Service of Process, 51 Fordham L. Rev. 127, 166 (1982) [hereinafter Note, Removing the
Cloak]; Note, Ancillary Process and Venue in the Federal Courts, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1164,
1175-78 (1960); Comment, Extraterritorial Service Provisions of Federal Statute Held In-
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breach of contract claim, the breach of contract claim could have re-
mained in the Court's jurisdiction as a pendent claim to the federal trade-
mark claim even if no diversity jurisdiction existed.24 9 Arguably, because
defendants unquestionably are going to litigate the trademark claim in
Florida, the entire suit should be litigated in one place. Viewing jurisdic-
tion as a matter of pure fairness to the defendant, once the defendant is
already subject to the authority of the court for a trademark claim, it is
not unfair to subject him to jurisdiction for all related claims. Viewing
jurisdiction from the due process standpoint as set out above, once the
threshold-plus-balancing test weighs against the defendant, the court
should allow all claims to be made against him.
The precedent for this argument largely stems from cases involving
nationwide service of process, where the state's long-arm statute proved
insufficient to obtain jurisdiction over the defendant for the pendent state
claim.250 One of the few appellate cases confronting the issue directly is
Robinson v. Penn Central Co.,25 where the Third Circuit held that the
district court had jurisdiction over the defendant for purposes of claims
pendent to a federal securities action. 252 The majority of other cases deal-
ing with the issue reach the same result. 253 These decisions stem from
the premises that nationwide service of process is always valid within the
United States,2 54 and that the same concept of judicial economy as a fac-
tor that allows federal courts to assert subject matter jurisdiction over
pendent claims, allows courts to assert personal jurisdiction over the pen-
dent claims as well.255 As previously discussed, however, the first prem-
ise, based on nationwide service of process, is not valid," 6 and the
second, judicial economy, does not per se seem to involve a sufficient
federal interest to overcome a defendant's liberty interest.
A strong argument can be made that under Rule 4(e), the federal court
applicable to Pendent Nonfederal Claim, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 762, 765 (1963) (discussing
the requirements of pendent jurisdiction).
249. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 US. 715 (1966).
250. See Note, Removing the Cloak, supra note 248, at 140-41.
251. 484 F.2d 553 (3d Cir. 1973).
252. Iad at 555-56. The Securities claims were made pursuant to the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U S.C. § 78aa (1982), and the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U S.C.
§ 77v (1982). Id at 554. There is nationwide service of process for these claims.
253. See, e.g., Oetiker v. Jurid Werke, G. m. b. H., 556 F.2d 1, 4-5 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(patent infringement claim); Emerson v. Falcon Mfg., 333 F. Supp. 888, 889-90 (S.D.
Tex. 1971) (securities claim); Kane v. Central Am. Mining & Oil, 235 F. Supp. 559, 567-
68 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (shareholders' derivative action). But see Wilensky v. Standard Be-
ryllium Corp., 228 F. Supp. 703, 705-06 (D. Mass. 1964) (pendent claim to securities
claim stricken when not supported by judicial economy).
254. See Robinson v. Penn Central Co., 484 F.2d 553, 554 (3d Cir. 1973) (noting that
Congress undisputably could extend process of federal district courts throughout the
United States) (citing Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 US. 438, 442
(1946)).
255. See Oetiker, 556 F.2d at 5; Emerson, 333 F. Supp. at 890; Kane, 235 F. Supp. at
568; Robinson, 484 F.2d at 555-56.
256. See supra notes 204-11 and accompanying text.
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lacks jurisdictional authority in diversity cases with federal claims. If
Congress has incorporated the limits of state statutes interpreted as not
going to the limit of due process into Rule 4(e), then, unless one can say
that personal jurisdiction is conferred directly by the nationwide service
of process statute, the limits of Rule 4(e) must be respected. There ap-
pears to be little precedent discussing this possibility.
In Oetiker v. Jurid Werke, G. m. b. H.,2"7 the court held that where
personal jurisdiction existed over a patent infringement claim, pendent
jurisdiction permitted personal jurisdiction over the defendant for a re-
lated federal claim .25  The court made this assertion without any discus-
sion of Rule 4(e), although the Rule was applicable to the related federal
claim.
Bodine's, Inc. v. Sunny-O, Inc. ,259 a diversity case involving tort and
contract claims, similarly allows jurisdiction on a pendent claim theory.
The court determined that federal personal jurisdiction existed under Illi-
nois law for the tort claim.2" Regarding the contract claim, the court
"believe[d] that it would not offend the underlying purposes of the Illi-
nois Long-Arm Statute for the Court to treat the contract claims as pen-
dent to the tort claim .... ,26 The court refused to recognize the strict
limits of the Illinois statute for purposes of this additional, related
claim.262
In RFD Group Ltd. v. Rubber Fabricators, Inc. ,263 however, the South-
ern District of New York, without discussing pendent jurisdiction, dis-
missed certain claims in a diversity action as not within New York's
long-arm statute, although they had a relationship to claims for which
personal jurisdiction existed.2
Purely statutory grounds justify the decisions in Oetiker and RFD
Group, as well as in nationwide service cases like Robinson. Note, how-
ever, that although the concept of pendent claims was not developed
fully at the time that many of the nationwide service statutes were en-
acted, Congress presumably intended to give broad reach to them.265 In
Robinson, the statute allowing nationwide service arguably was intended
to allow such service for pendent or related claims.266 This would cir-
cumvent the Rule 4(e) problem. In a federal question case with a pen-
257. 556 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1977).
258. Id. at 4-5.
259. 494 F. Supp. 1279 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
260. Id. at 1281.
261. Id. at 1285 (citation omitted).
262. Id. at 1284-85.
263. 323 F. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
264. Id. at 524-27.
265. See, e.g., Bertozzi v. King Louie Int'l, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1166, 1170 (D.R.I. 1976)
(noting the "wide accessibility that § 27 [(the nationwide service provision of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934)] is designed to provide"); In re Whippany Paper Bd. Co., 15
B.R. 312, 314 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1981) (discussing nationwide service under the Bankruptcy
Rules).
266. See Robinson v. Penn Central Co., 484 F.2d 553, 555-56 (3d Cir. 1973). Related
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dent state claim, like Oetiker and Robinson, and even in diversity cases
like Bodine's, the proposed test would allow jurisdiction as long as the
amenability problem is the result of constitutional limitations, not of lim-
itations inherent in the state long-arm statute.
Even if jurisdiction is justified on statutory grounds, however, it still
must satisfy due process under the fifth amendment, which requires an
identifiable federal interest. With regard to purely pendent claims, or to
claims raising only state law issues, the above discussion of diversity
claims might militate against such an interest. On the other hand, there
are significant federal interests in a case involving both federal and state
claims that are lacking in a pure diversity case.267
D. Interpleader
Federal interpleader is a major exception to the complete diversity re-
quirement. The Federal Interpleader Act2 68 provides for nationwide ser-
vice of process for such actions, which are brought on the basis of
diversity among the claimants.2 69
Although federal courts apply state law to resolve a federal inter-
pleader claim,27° legitimate federal interests in establishing an amenabil-
ity standard still exist. The original impetus for the Federal Interpleader
Act was the unavailability of personal jurisdiction in one state court over
all the claimants.271 The statute permits the stakeholder to join claim-
ants from different places.272 Modem standards of jurisdiction undoubt-
edly enable states to entertain the overwhelming majority of such cases,
where they choose to do SO.2 73 This alone does not eliminate the possibil-
ity of a federal interest.
In addition to creating a federal protection against potential multiple
claims technically would not be pendent if they were subject to independent federal juris-
diction such as diversity.
267. See supra notes 235-38 and accompanying text.
268. 28 US.C. § 1335 (1982).
269. 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1982).
270. See Great Falls Transfer & Storage Co. v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 353 F.2d
348, 349-50 (10th Cir. 1965); Kerrigan's Estate v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 199
F.2d 694, 697 (3d Cir. 1952); see also Griffin v. McCoach, 313 US. 498, 503 (1941)
(federal court must look to the forum state's choice of law rules to determine which
state's law will govern as to the rights of claimants).
271. See Chafee, Interpleader in the United States Courts, 41 Yale LJ. 1134, 1136
(1932); see also New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 US. 518, 521 (1916); 7 C.
Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1702, at 493 (2d ed.
1986).
272. See 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1982).
273. Many state long-arm statutes do not cover the transactions that would lead to an
interpleader action, focusing instead on "tortious acts" and the like. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ.
Prac. L. & R. § 302 (McKinney 1978); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4 (1983); I11. Ann. Stat.
Ch. 110 § 2-209 (1983). Note, however, that the early passage of the federal statute-
long before International Shoe-eliminated the need for broad state jurisdiction over in-
terpleader actions. Thus, the lack of state involvement in the area may reflect the pre-
emptive action of federal law.
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litigation, the current federal act eliminates many of the technical limita-
tions of common law interpleader procedure.274 Moreover, when com-
bined with a low five hundred dollar minimum claim value for the federal
proceeding,2 75 the Act provides a greater incentive for use of federal, in-
stead of state, courts. This has resulted in the development of a well-
defined, uniform remedy276 that protects many entities doing business in
interstate commerce from the vagaries of differing state practices. 2 " Be-
cause interstate commerce is recognized explicitly in the Constitution as
a federal concern,278 the substantiality of a federal interest in using fed-
eral amenability standards is clear.
This does not mean, however, that the extremely broad amenability
standards of the Federal Interpleader Act are beyond question in all
cases. The problems with amenability under the Act lie not so much with
the availability of nationwide service as with its interaction with the
venue provisions of the Act. Venue is proper where any claimant re-
sides.279 Because the Act requires only minimal diversity, venue is
proper in a district with almost no connection to the stakeholder or to
the great majority of claimants.28 ° It is difficult to see what federal inter-
est requires allowing jurisdiction under all such circumstances. If the
claimants were scattered around the country, with no real plurality of
residence, this result could be justifiable on the grounds of necessity. 28'
When the majority of claimants would be inconvenienced severely by the
choice of venue, however, their liberty interests ought not to be invaded
so cavalierly.
274. 7 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1701, at
488-91 (2d ed. 1986).
275. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1982).
276. See, e.g., Maryland Casualty Co. v. Glassell-Taylor & Robinson, 156 F.2d 519,
523-24 (5th Cir. 1946); Irving Trust Co. v. Nationwide Leisure Corp., 95 F.R.D. 51, 59
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Adams, 231 F. Supp. 860, 867 (S.D. Ind.
1964).
277. In Chafee, Interstate Interpleader, 33 Yale L.J. 685 (1924), Professor Chafec
stated that "[w]hile our present governmental machinery is adequately adapted for
preventing state interference with national powers, or vice versa, a serious and little dis-
cussed difficulty is the absence of machinery to adjust clashes and secure co-operation
among the states." Id. at 685.
278. US. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
279. 28 US.C. § 1397 (1982).
280. The statute allows "minimal" diversity, see id.; that is, the claim may be brought
as long as any two claimants are diverse. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386
US. 523, 530 (1967).
Interpleader claims also may be brought under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule
22. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 22. The Rule requires complete diversity, however, and jurisdic-
tion would be determined according to Rule 4 standards. See 7 C. Wright, A. Miller &
M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1703, at 498-99 (2d ed. 1986) (Rule 22 re-
quires complete diversity between stakeholder and claimants); id. at 499 (service of pro-
cess for Rule 22 is made according to Rule 4).
281. Cf Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 US. 306, 313, 317-18
(1950) (permitting service of process by publication to obtain jurisdiction over benefi-
ciaries to a common trust fund who are scattered around the country).
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Some cases involving jurisdiction over claimants in the interpleader
context have discussed the limits of the federal interest involved. Those
cases held that the remedial function served by the Act does not allow a
court to assert jurisdiction over claimants for claims not directly pro-
vided for under the Act.2" 2 This is a proper conclusion; the federal inter-
est resides in protecting against multiple vexatious of stakeholders, not in
providing a comprehensive action to resolve all related claims.2"' Thus,
if reasonably restricted, the nationwide service provision is consistent in
most cases with the governmental interest standard. The court must de-
termine, on a case-by-case basis, that the interest served by the Federal
Interpleader Act surpasses the intermediate threshold necessary to over-
come the stakeholders' or claimants' due process interest.
E. A Final Aside-Federal Law in the State Courts
Under the proposed test, federal courts would take federal interests
into account when deciding amenability questions. In addition, federal
interests also arise when state courts decide federal question cases.
Whether state courts should be required to use federal amenability stan-
dards or should apply their own long-arm statutes with fourteenth
amendment restrictions depends on whether the state standards would
interfere with the federal policy embodied in the substantive law being
applied.284 In areas where the federal statute allows nationwide service
of process, Congress has expressed a policy allowing plaintiffs a liberal
choice of forum as a substantive aspect of the remedy involved.28 5
Therefore, state courts should follow the federal statute and afford na-
282. See, e.g., Hagan v. Central Ave. Dairy, Inc., 180 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1950) (dis-
missing cross-claim arising out of the same transaction because it would enlarge the juris-
diction of a court and create rights not provided for under the Act); Marine Bank &
Trust. Co. v. Hamilton Bros., 55 F.R.D. 505 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (co-defendant not permit-
ted to maintain cross-claim against non-resident defendant served with process under the
procedures set for nationwide service of process); see also Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 733 F.2d 484, 487 (7th Cir. 1984) (plaintiff not allowed to use interpleader
action to subject defendant to personal jurisdiction when the defendant otherwise would
not have been subject to jurisdiction), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 1753 (1985).
283. See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 US. 523 (1967), where the
Court stated that the interpleader device was never meant to be a" 'bill of peace,' capable
of sweeping dozens of lawsuits out of the various state and federal courts in which they
were brought and into a single interpleader proceeding." Id. at 535-36.
284. Although cases containing a discussion of jurisdiction in this context do not ap-
pear to exist, the concept that state courts must use federal law when state law interferes
with federal interests is expressed in case law in other contexts. See Dice v. Akron, C. &
Y. R. Co., 342 US. 359, 361 (1952) (federal law determines defenses under federal stat-
ute); Brown v. Western Ry. of Ala., 338 US. 294, 298-99 (1949) (states' trial practice
cannot defeat a right created by federal law).
285. In Kane v. Central Am. Mining & Oil, 235 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), the
court, discussing the broad venue provisions of section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act,
15 U S.C. § 78aa (1982), noted that they reflected "the Congressional purpose of provid-
ing an accessible forum for imposing the Act's standards upon multistate transactions in
securities." 235 F. Supp. at 565. Then, discussing the nationwide service of process pro-
visions also contained in section 27, the court stated: "[C]onsidering the broad remedial
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tionwide service, subject to the fifth amendment governmental interest
standard. This would measure federal, not state interests, even though a
state court resolves a suit.
This issue seldom arises in practice because most statutes providing for
nationwide service also give exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts.2 6
Some exceptions do exist. 2 7 One state case, however, lends implicit sup-
port to the position set forth here. In Lakewood Bank & Trust Co. v.
Superior Court,"'8 plaintiff alleged violations of sections 5 and 12 of the
Securities Act of 1933289 and of state law. The statute provides for both
concurrent jurisdiction and nationwide service.2 90 Although the court ul-
timately determined that the plaintiff did not properly state a claim
under the Securities Act, in dictum it appeared to assume nationwide
service would apply if the federal statute were found to be applicable.29 ,
Moreover, the jurisdictional authority in a nationwide service case comes
from a federal statute. Hence it is fitting that a fifth amendment stan-
dard, incorporating federal concerns, apply.
In cases where the federal statute does not contain a nationwide ser-
vice of process provision, the issue is different. By failing to provide an
express jurisdictional statute, Congress apparently has delegated the stat-
utory standard of authority to the states' long-arm statutes.2 92 Since this
constitutes the same standard as would be used in a federal court, it is
not altogether out of place. To measure the federal interests in having a
federal dispute resolved in a particular location by purely state concerns,
however, is inappropriate. Nevertheless, the source of jurisdictional au-
thority is now a state statute, and the more appropriate standard may be
a fourteenth amendment one, in which case the concerns of the state,
perhaps weaker in this circumstance, will be the ones to measure. This
objective of the 1934 Act, it would be an anomaly to expand the venue provision and at
the same time to contract service of process amenability." Id. at 566-67.
286. See, e.g., 15 US.C. § 78aa (1982); 28 US.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1982); 42 US.C.
§ 9613(b) (1982); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1982).
287. One such exception is the Securities Act of 1933, which gives concurrent subject
matter jurisdiction over claims brought under the statute to state and federal courts. 15
U.S.C. § 77v (1982).
288. 129 Cal. App. 3d 463, 180 Cal. Rptr. 914 (Cal. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1982).
289. See id. at 469, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 917; 15 U.S.C. § 77e, 771 (1982).
290. Lakewood Bank & Trust, 129 Cal. App. 3d at 468-69, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 916-17
(citing 15 U S.C. § 77v(a) (1982)).
291. See id. at 470-71, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 918 ("California court may obtain jurisdiction
over petitioner pursuant to section 22(a) [of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934] only if
... a claim ... is either brought to enforce any liability or duty created by the Securities
Act of 1933 or is fundamentally derived from and dependent on such claim."). For a
contrary view, see Negin v. Cico Oil & Gas Co., 46 Misc. 2d 367, 259 N.Y.S.2d 434 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct., N.Y. County 1965). In Negin, the court rejected use of the nationwide service
provisions of the Securities Act of 1933. It reasoned that the language of the Act, which
refers to suits being brought in any district, did not apply to cases brought in the state
courts. Id. at 368, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 436 (interpreting § 22(a) of the Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1982)).
292. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4.
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may make it more difficult to sue out-of-state defendants in state court on
federal claims, but this may not be an undesirable result.
CONCLUSION
The analysis of jurisdiction of federal courts suffers from two funda-
mental problems: the first is Rule 4 which is difficult to apply, and which
has resulted in an anomalous use of fourteenth amendment standards to
judge the propriety of federal action, and the second is constitutional
tests which, divorced from other due process cases, have proven less than
ideal in the federal area, and imperfect even for state courts.
For over one hundred years, courts have measured jurisdiction by the
constitutional test of "due process." It has been treated as a due process
outsider, however, never quite considered part of mainstream due pro-
cess analysis. Lack of analytical uniformity in general does not justify
the complete exclusion of jurisdiction from the traditional analysis.
Moreover, keeping jurisdictional analysis in its own due process box has
led to decisions that, despite the emergence of the minimum contacts
analysis, are often ad hoc.
The unified analysis proposed here will not work radical changes in the
results of cases; it will, however, produce some changes. It also will al-
low a careful consideration of the real interests involved in a jurisdiction
decision. In federal courts, it will prevent federal interests from being
ignored, while allowing due process rights to be protected in cases, such
as nationwide service, that currently ignore this issue. It is hoped that
this Article will provoke a careful reconsideration of the jurisdiction
question in federal courts, and will constitute a first step in making the
analysis of jurisdiction a more reasonable and rational one.
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